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EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND THE
CONSEQUENCES OF GUILTY PLEAS
Gabriel. Chint & Richard W. Holmes, Jr.tt
Because over ninety percent of criminal convictions result from guilty
pleas, perhaps the most important service criminal defense lawyers perform is
advising their clients whether to plead guilty and on what terms. Neverthe-
less, virtually all jurisdictions hold that defense counsel need not discuss
with their clients the collateral consequences of a conviction, such as consecu-
tive rather than concurrent sentencing deportation, or even treatment as an
aggravating circumstance in an ongoing capital prosecution. In this Arti-
cle, Professor Chin and Mr. Holmes argue that this "collateral consequences
rule" is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v.
Washington, which held that ineffective assistance of counsel consists of
performance below a minimum standard of competence and resulting
prejudice. The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice and other lawyering
guidelines require defense lawyers to consider collateral consequences, and
many of the cases espousing the collateral consequences rule rely on pre-
Strickland case law. However, this Article recognizes that because guilty
pleas are indispensable to the criminal justice system, judges justifiably hesi-
tate to destabilize them. In order to prevent a mass exodus from prisons, it
recommends modifying the rule to conform with existing Sixth Amendment
doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
The most important service that criminal defense lawyers per-
form for their clients is not dramatic cross-examination of prosecution
witnesses or persuasive closing arguments to the jury; it is advising cli-
ents whether to plead guilty and on what terms.1 More than ninety
percent of dispositions on the merits of criminal prosecutions are con-
victions, and more than ninety percent of convictions result from
guilty pleas.2 Accordingly, the accuracy and fairness of the criminal
justice system depend principally on the actions of defense lawyers,
prosecutors, and judges at the guilty plea stage. In Hill v. Lockhart,3
the Supreme Court recognized the significance of counsel at the
pleading stage, holding that the Sixth Amendment grants clients the
right to effective assistance of counsel when pleading guilty.4
1 ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES § 201
(4th ed. 1984) ("The decision whether to plead guilty or to contest a criminal charge is
ordinarily the most important single decision in any criminal case."); William N. Clark, Plea
Bargaining. A Primer for Defense Counsel 9 CUMB. L. REv. 1, 4 (1978).
2 See, e.g., BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIM-
INALJUSTICE STATISTICS 1999, at 432-33 tbl.5.32 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen Maguire eds.,
2000) (indicating that for federal district courts in fiscal year 1999, there were 1017 acquit-
tals and 64,815 convictions, 61,239 of which were by guilty plea). Figures from earlier
decades are similar. See, e.g., DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICrION: THE DETERMINATION OF
GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 3 & n.1 (1966) ("Roughly 90 per cent of all criminal
convictions are by pleas of guilty ... ").
3 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
4 Id. at 58 (holding that the two-part test for evaluating ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claims developed in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), "applies to challenges
to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel"). Indeed, Hill involved a claim of
ineffective assistance flowing from the unexpected imposition of a collateral consequence.
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In spite of the importance of counsel, one of the most widely ac-
cepted principles of American criminal procedure is that defense law-
yers' constitutional duty to advise clients is limited in a particular way:
As Part II explains, while lawyers must advise clients of the direct con-
sequences of a guilty plea-such as the period of incarceration and
the fine that will be imposed at sentencing 5-eleven federal circuits,
more than thirty states, and the District of Columbia have held that
lawyers need not explain collateral consequences, which, although
they might follow by operation of law, are not part of the penalty im-
posed by the particular statute the defendant is accused of violating.6
Apparently no court rejects the rule.7
The idea that collateral consequences are divorced from the
criminal process has never really been true; for example, the plea of
nolo contendere exists solely to avoid collateral consequences of a guilty
plea,8 and courts recognize that collateral consequences can prevent
the mootness of a habeas corpus petition filed by a prisoner who is
later released.9 However, the imposition of collateral consequences
has become an increasingly central purpose of the modem criminal
process. For example, it is fairly typical for an individual pleading
guilty for the first time to felony possession or sale of hard drugs to
walk out of court, receiving a sentence of time served and probation.' 0
The collateral consequences are a far more meaningful result of such
a conviction. By virtue of the conviction, the offender may become
ineligible for federally funded health care benefits," food stamps and
But the Court's decision did not dispose of the issue presented here; the case involved
incorrect advice about a collateral consequence, rather than a failure to address it at all.
5 See infra Part J..
6 See infra notes 43-114 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 115-24 and accompanying text.
8 See, e.g., United States v.Jones, 119 F. Supp. 288, 290-91 (S.D. Cal. 1954) ("Defend-
ants often desire to avoid the effect of a plea of Guilty which might be used as an admission
generally and be introduced in evidence in a civil case based on the same transaction.");
Fortson v. Hopper, 247 S.E.2d 875, 877 (Ga. 1978) ("The privilege of entering a plea of
nolo contendere is statutory in origin, and it was designed to cover situations where the
side effects of a plea of guilty, in addition to the penalties provided by law, would be too
harsh." (citations omitted)); State v. Black, 624 N.W.2d 363, 369 (Wis. 2001) ("A no contest
plea... differs from a plea of guilty in its collateral effects." (citation omitted)).
9 See 1 JANiEs S. LiEBMAN & RANDY HERTz, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACrICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 8.2b (3d ed. 1998).
10 See, e.g., People v. Winston, 737 N.E.2d 304, 305 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); People v. Dela
Cruz, 722 N.Y.S.2d 438 (App. Div. 2001); People v. Francis, 721 N.Y.S.2d 814 (App. Div.
2001); State v. Smith, No. 07-97-0252-CR, 2001 WL 311159, at *1 (Tex. App. Mar. 30,
2001); Pando v. State, No. 08-98-00336-CR, 2000 WL 1207180, at *1 (Tex. App. Aug. 25,
2000).
11 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) ("The Secretary shall exclude...
from participation in any Federal health care program .... (4) .... [a]ny individual...
convicted . . . of a criminal offense consisting of a felony relating to the unlawful ...
distribution... of a controlled substance."); id. § 1320a-7(b) (3) (permissive disqualifica-
tion for misdemeanor convictions).
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Temporary Assistance for Needy Families,' 2 and housing assistance.' 3
She is ineligible for federal educational aid.' 4 Her driver's license will
probably be suspended 15 and she will be ineligible to enlist in the mili-
tary, receive a security clearance,' 6 or possess a firearm.' 7 If an alien,
she will be deported;' 8 if a citizen, she will be ineligible to serve on a
federal jury and in some states will lose her right to vote.' 9 In cases
like these, traditional sanctions such as fine or imprisonment are com-
paratively insignificant. The real work of the conviction is performed
by the collateral consequences.
Collateral consequences can operate as a secret sentence. Re-
gardless of the objective significance of the collateral consequence or
its significance to the particular client, and even if the collateral con-
sequences are much more severe than the direct consequences, many
courts hold that "neither the trial judge nor defense counsel is re-
quired to explain the 'collateral consequences' of a guilty plea to the
defendant,"20 and therefore "counsel's failure to advise the defendant
of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea cannot rise to the level
of constitutionally ineffective assistance." 2' Thus, some courts hold
that counsel has no obligation to advise his client that prison
sentences may be served consecutively rather than concurrently, even
if that means, for example, that the client will serve forty rather than
twenty years. 22 Courts have held counsel effective when they advised
clients to plead guilty to trivial offenses, such as stealing cigarettes,
without considering that a conviction will result in deportation.23 A
12 21 U.S.C. § 862a(a) (Supp. V 1999). States could opt out of this ban. Id.
§ 862(d) (1).
13 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(B)(iii) (Supp. V 1999); id. § 13662(a).
'4 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r) (Supp. V 1999).
15 23 U.S.C. § 159 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (denying funds to states that do not impose
driver's license suspension on persons convicted of drug offenses). Staes could opt out of
this ban. Id. § 159(a) (3) (B).
16 10 U.S.C. § 504 (2000); id. § 986(c) (1) (deeming felons ineligible for security
clearance).
'7 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1) (1994).
18 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2) (B) (2000).
19 See 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b) (5) (1994) (disqualifying from jury service persons con-
victed of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year). Laws disen-
franchising felons are surveyed inJamie Fellner & Marc Mauer, Losing the Vote: The Impact of
Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States (1998), available at http://
wwv.sentencingproject.org/pubs/hrwfvr.html, and Patricia Allard & Marc Mauer, Regard-
ing the Vote: An Assessment of Activity Relating to Felon Disenfranchisement Laws (Jan. 2000),
available at http://wwwv.sentencingproject.org/pubs/regainvote.pdf. The Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of felon disenfranchisement in Richardson v. Ramirem, 418 U.S.
24, 56 (1974).
20 Goodall v. United States, 759 A.2d 1077, 1081 (D.C. 2000).
21 United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 768 (11th Cir. 1985).
22 See, e.g., Ned v. State, No. 09-98-435CR, 1999 WL 388158, at *2 (Tex. App. June 9,
1999) (per curiam).
23 See, e.g., Berkow v. State, 583 N.W.2d 562 (Minn. 1998).
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lawyer representing a broker-dealer registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission need not disclose that a misdemeanor guilty
plea24 could put his client out of business.25 A lawyer need not even
disclose to a client facing capital charges that a guilty plea to unre-
lated charges will be treated as an aggravating circumstance in the
capital case; the possibility of execution is a mere collateral
consequence. 26
This wall of precedent is surprising because it seems inconsistent
with the framework that the Supreme Court has laid out for analyzing
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.2 7 As Part I.B explains, in
Strickland v. Washington,28 decided in 1984, the Supreme Court held
that a defendant could make out a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel by showing that her lawyer's conduct fell below a minimum
standard of competence and that she was prejudiced thereby.29 In
evaluating competence, the Court explained, judges should look at all
relevant circumstances and evidence of appropriate measures of pro-
fessional behavior, such as the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice
("ABA Standards").3° The ABA Standards require defense lawyers to
consider collateral consequences of conviction. 31 In this, the ABA
Standards are consistent with other evidence of the norms of compe-
tent lawyering, such as legal treatises and practitioners' materials, all
of which emphasize the importance of considering collateral conse-
quences in evaluating risks and setting goals for criminal litigation.32
The collateral consequences rule presents a puzzle that has not been
explored by scholars: 33 Why do virtually all jurisdictions apply a rule
24 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (4) (B) (i) (1994).
25 Cf United States v. Casanova's, Inc., 350 F. Supp. 291, 292 (E.D. Wis. 1972)
("Knowledge of collateral consequences of a guilty plea is not necessary to render a guilty
plea voluntary. The loss of a license to operate a business falls within this latter category.");
State v. Carney, 584 N.W.2d 907, 910 (Iowa 1998) (holding, in a case involving driver's
license revocation, that because "the consequence of license revocation is collateral, we
find counsel was not ineffective in failing to inform defendant of it" and that "[t]he failure
to advise a defendant concerning a collateral consequence, even serious ones, cannot pro-
vide a basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel").
26 King v. Dutton, 17 F.3d 151, 154 (6th Cir. 1994); Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d 334,
350 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); Ex parte Morrow, 952 S.W.2d 530, 536-37 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997) (en banc).
27 See infra Part I.B.
28 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
29 See id.; infra notes 143-67 and accompanying text.
30 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-91.
31 See infra notes 180-88 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 189-217 and accompanying text.
33 There are several student notes on the issue, most focusing on deportation in par-
ticular rather than collateral consequences generally. See Priscilla Budeiri, Comment, Col-
lateral Consequences of Guilty Pleas in the Federal CriminalJustice System, 16 HARv. C.R-C.L. L.
Rm'. 157, 190-99 (1981); Guy Cohen, Note, Weakness of the Collateral Consequences Doctrine:
Coarnses Duty to Inform Aliens of the Deportation Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 16 FoDHAM Irr'L
L.J. 1094 (1992-1993).
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that seems to be contrary to the result apparently required under the
Court's analytical structure?
One set of answers is doctrinal. Very few cases actually apply the
Strickland standards, evaluating as a matter of professional practice
whether competent counsel consider collateral consequences in gen-
eral or should under the particular facts of the case. Instead, most
courts following the rule simply rely on precedent-earlier cases rec-
ognizing only a limited role for defense counsel. Part II suggests that
almost all of the leading cases, and therefore the decisions that rest on
them, are burdened with one or more of several distinct flaws.
First, the collateral consequences rule was created before the de-
cision in Strickland. Yet cases decided under earlier formulations of
the right to counsel that are inconsistent with Strickland are still cited
and influential. 34 In addition, many courts define the scope of coun-
sel's duties by using cases that describe the obligations of courts taking
guilty pleas. 35 These jurisdictions conclude that when a court has dis-
charged its duty of advisement, counsel's duty has also been fulfilled.36
These cases fail to account for the distinct roles ofjudge and advocate
in the criminal justice system, which necessarily entail different du-
ties.3 7 Finally, some cases rely on the idea that counsel have lesser
responsibilities in the context of guilty pleas. This notion is inconsis-
tent with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence recognizing the impor-
tance of counsel at plea and sentencing as well as at trial.38
Doctrinal error cannot be the whole story, however; too many
judges in too many jurisdictions over too many years have relied on
the collateral consequences rule to chalk up all of these decisions to
analytical insufficiency. Part III suggests that another factor which
seems to be operative is a judicial reluctance to render guilty pleas
vulnerable to attack. Guilty pleas are indispensable to the criminal
justice system, and the decision to plead guilty or go to trial is part of
every criminal conviction. Accordingly, judges may hesitate to do any-
thing that could potentially invalidate large numbers of convictions.
For example, is a person who pleaded guilty to murder in Idaho and
received a life sentence entitled to take back her plea because she was
not advised that, in the event she was ever pardoned, upon release she
would not be able to get a barber's license in Georgia? Existing Sixth
Amendment doctrine would likely prevent a mass exodus from pris-
ons on such grounds. Most defendants who plead guilty to serious
crimes with significant terms of imprisonment would be unable to
34 See infra Part II.A.
35 See infra Part II.B-C.
36 See infra Part II.B.
37 See infra Part II.C.
38 See infra Part II.D.
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show that knowledge or ignorance of a collateral consequence would
have had any impact on their decision.3 9 Moreover, lawyers are
charged with a duty of reasonable knowledge and investigation, not
perfection or omniscience, and are permitted to choose the most
fruitful lines of defense.40 A reasonable effort to explore collateral
consequences would satisfy counsel's obligation.
Even if reexamining the collateral consequences rule would not
throw open the doors to the penitentiary, it would not be cost-free
either. Nevertheless, Part III argues that expecting lawyers to explore
collateral consequences would have a number of salutary effects on
the system. First, in some cases defendants who might be acquitted
after trial plead guilty to relatively minor offenses because the cost of
defense exceeds seemingly minimal penalties and consequences. 41
Courts in some jurisdictions recognize this by refusing to apply the
doctrine of collateral estoppel to certain guilty pleas. Yet those same
pleas could have significant collateral consequences. In essence, de-
fendants may be misled into pleading guilty, which is unjust.
Second, most lawyers already take into account collateral conse-
quences in their evaluation of particular pleas; there is no reason why
their clients should obtain better results than those clients unlucky
enough to be represented by less able counsel. Eliminating the collat-
eral consequences rule would encourage lawyers to represent their cli-
ents more effectively. As a result, prosecutors and judges would be
presented with additional relevant facts in some cases where they oth-
ervise would not. This would help achieve more consistent and fair
results, in which the plea and sentence would be based more on the
facts and circumstances and less on the happenstance of which lawyer
is representing the defendant.42
I
THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCEs RuLE AND
EFFECTrvE ASSISTANCE
Borrowing principles applicable to courts accepting guilty pleas,
all courts that have considered the issue have held that defense law-
yers must explain the direct consequences of a plea, such as length of
imprisonment and amount of fine, but need not explain "collateral
consequences," such as revocation of probation or parole, that
sentences may be served consecutively rather than concurrently, or
that the plea may result in deportation. Advising about collateral con-
39 See infra notes 297-98 and accompanying text.
40 See infra notes 299-303 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 305-07 and accompanying text.
42 See infra note 308 and accompanying text.
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sequences, these courts have said, is not part of effective assistance of
counsel.
Although this rule is simple and clear, courts applying it have not
explained how it fits into the system for evaluating claims of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel, which begins with the question of whether
the attorney's conduct was professionally competent. In contrast to
courts applying the collateral consequences rule, other sources such
as the ABA Standards, legal treatises, and practitioner's materials sug-
gest that lawyers should be concerned about collateral consequences.
Because the client is making a decision about whether to admit guilt
and be convicted of a crime, these materials say, counsel has an obli-
gation to offer legal advice on all of the legal considerations that
might be relevant to the client's decision.
A. The Collateral Consequences Rule
Under various provisions of civil and criminal statutes, a convic-
tion for a crime may result in numerous legal consequences to the
defendant.43 For purposes of determining whether a trial court has
complied with its duty under the Due Process Clause to ensure that a
guilty plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, the Supreme Court
has distinguished between direct consequences, which must be ex-
plained to the defendant, and collateral consequences, which the plea
court has no duty to explore.44 Some courts justify the rule on the
ground that the trial court is required to explain only consequences
that are largely automatic; 45 others hold that the distinction is justified
because collateral consequences are beyond the control of the sen-
tencing court.46 If supervised release and special parole terms served
after incarceration are included as collateral consequences, 47 then the
Third Circuit's view that "[t] he only consequences considered direct
are the maximum prison term and fine for the offense charged" 48 is
an accurate rule of thumb, even though, as the District of Columbia
43 See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 23-8.1 & cmt. (1986); Nora V.
Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Conse-
quences, 11 STAN. L. & POLY REv. 153 (1999); Kathleen M. Olivares et al., The Collateral
Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A National Study of State Legal Codes 10 Years Later, FED.
PROBATION, Sept. 1996, at 10.
44 See infra notes 242-49 and accompanying text.
45 In United States v. Littlejohn, 224 F.3d 960, 966-67 (9th Cir. 2000), the court held
that denial of social welfare benefits as a result of conviction was a direct consequence
because it was "automatic."
46 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 2000).
47 United States v. Harris, 534 F.2d 141, 141-42 (9th Cir. 1976); People v. Alcock, 728
N.Y.S.2d 328, 330-31 (Sup. Ct. 2001).
48 United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1130 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing United States v.
Pearson, 910 F.2d 221, 223 (5th Cir. 1990)); see also United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919,
921 (2d Cir. 1954) (holding that deportation is a collateral consequence of conviction).
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Circuit has stated, "[t] he distinction between a collateral and a direct
consequence of a criminal conviction, like many of the lines drawn in
legal analysis, is obvious at the extremes and often subtle at the
margin."49
Consequences of conviction deemed collateral by most courts5°
include: effects on custody such as revocation of parole51 or proba-
tion,52 ineligibility for parole,53 civil commitment,54 civil forfeiture,55
consecutive rather than concurrent sentencing 5 6 higher penalties
based on repeat offender laws,5 7 and registration requirements.
58
Also usually deemed collateral are effects on civil status such as disen-
franchisement,59 ineligibility to serve on ajury,60 disqualification from
public benefits, 6 ' and ineligibility to possess firearms. 62 The same is
true for deprivations with tremendous practical consequences, such as
49 United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
50 See generally 5 WAXNE R- LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.4(d) (2d ed.
1999) (providing a list of consequences of conviction that courts have deemed direct or
collateral).
51 See, e.g., Sanchez v. United States, 572 F.2d 210, 211 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
52 See, e.g., Parry v. Rosemeyer, 64 F.3d 110, 114-15 (3d Cir. 1995); Weaver v. United
States, 454 F.2d 315, 317-18 (7th Cir. 1971).
53 See, e.g., Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d 1545, 1548-49 (l1th Cir. 1989); Trujillo
v. United States, 377 F.2d 266, 268-69 (5th Cir. 1967). But see State v. Smith, 513 So. 2d
544, 547-51 (La. C. App. 1987).
54 See, e.g., Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366-67 (4th Cir. 1973);
Martin v. Reinstein, 987 P.2d 779, 805-06 (Ariz. C. App. 1999).
55 See, e.g., United States v. United States Currency in the Amount of $228,536.00, 895
F.2d 908, 914-17 (2d Cir. 1990).
56 See, e.g., United States v. Rubalcaba, 811 F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir. 1987); Paradiso v.
United States, 482 F.2d 409, 415 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Vermeulen, 436 F.2d 72,
75 (2d Cir. 1970); State v. Johnson, 532 N.E.2d 1295, 1298 (Ohio 1988). But cf. People v.
Flannigan, 267 N.E.2d 739, 744 (11. App. Ct. 1971) (noting court rules requiring advise-
ment of the manner in which the defendant may have to serve imposed sentences);
Rosemond v. State, 756 P.2d 1180, 1181 (Nev. 1988) (per curiam) (noting that courts must
disclose mandatory consecutive sentences but not discretionary consecutive sentences).
57 See, e.g., Fee v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 674, 676 (W.D. Va. 1962); State v. Barton,
609 P.2d 1353 (Wash. 1980) (en banc). But cf. Ashley v. State, 614 So. 2d 486, 490 (Fla.
1993) (noting that a court rule required notice of intent to seek enhanced habitual of-
fender sentencing prior to sentencing).
58 See, e.g., Kaiser v. State, 621 N.W.2d 49, 53-54 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
59 See, e.g., Meaton v. United States, 328 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1964) (per curiam); United
States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 1963).
60 See, e.g., State v. Vasquez, 889 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tex. App. 1994) (citing United
States v. Banda, 1 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1993)).
61 See, e.g., United States v. Okelberry, 112 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1248 (D. Utah 2000)
(citing United States v. Morse, 36 F.3d 1070, 1072 (11th Cir. 1994)); United States v. Reed,
54 MJ. 37, 44-45 (C.A.A.F. 2000). But see United States v. Littlejohn, 224 F.3d 960, 966-67
(9th Cir. 2000) (finding that defendant's disqualification from public benefits following
his conviction is a direct consequence).
62 See, e.g., State v. Ellis, Nos. 0-769, 98-1888, 2001 WL 103530, at *2 (Iowa Cr. App.
Feb. 7, 2001).
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deportation, 63 dishonorable discharge from the armed services, 64 and
loss of business or professional licenses. 65
The Supreme Court created the rule that the Due Process Clause
requires the trial court to explain only the direct consequences of
conviction. 66 The extension of this principle to defense counsel's du-
ties under the Sixth Amendment, although never passed upon by the
Supreme Court, is nevertheless among the most widely recognized
rules of American law. In the federal system, it has been accepted by
the Courts of Appeals for the First,67 Second,68 Third,69 Fourth,70
Fifth, 71 Sixth,72 Seventh,73 Ninth,74 Tenth,75 Eleventh,76 and District
of Columbia77 Circuits, and by the Army Court of Military Review. 78
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia79 has accepted the
63 See, e.g., United States v. Porter, No. 90-5905, 1991 WL 54878, at *4 (6th Cir. Apr.
12, 1991) (per curiam); United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919, 921 (2d Cir. 1954). But see
United States v. El-Nobani, 145 F. Supp. 2d 906, 916-17 (N.D. Ohio 2001).
64 See, e.g., Torrey v. Estelle, 842 F.2d 234, 236 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Redwine v.
Zuckert, 317 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (per curiam)).
65 See, e.g., Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201, 1217 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc); United
States v. Casanova's, Inc., 350 F. Supp. 291, 292 (E.D. Wis. 1972). But see Barkley v. State,
724 A.2d 558 (Del. 1999) (holding that automatic revocation of a driver's license is a direct
consequence).
66 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970).
67 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v.
Quin, 836 F.2d 654 (1st Cir. 1988).
68 Russo v. United States, No. 97-2891, 1999 WL 164951, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 22, 1999);
United States v. Santelises, 509 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
69 See, e.g., Meyers v. Gillis, 93 F.3d 1147, 1153 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that neither
the court nor counsel is required to inform defendant about parole eligibility); see also
Gov't of V.I. v. Pamphile, 604 F. Supp. 753, 756-58 (D.V.I. 1985) (holding that counsel's
failure to inform the defendant of the possibility of deportation does not constitute ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel). But cf. Parry v. Rosemeyer, 64 F.3d 110, 118 (3d Cir. 1995)
(reserving the question of whether failure to advise defendant about the consequences of a
revoked term of probation constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel); United States v.
Nino, 878 F.2d 101, 105 (3d Cir. 1989) (same).
70 See, e.g., United States v. DeFreitas, 865 F.2d 80, 82 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6 (4th Cir. 1988).
71 See, e.g., United States v. Banda, 1 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Gavilan,
761 F.2d 226, 228-29 (5th Cir. 1985).
72 See, e.g., King v. Dutton, 17 F.3d 151, 154 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Porter,
No. 90-5905, 1991 WL 54878, at *4-*5 (6th Cir. Apr. 12, 1991) (per curiam); United States
v. Hall, No. 86-3588, 1987 WL 37001 (6th Cir. Apr. 10, 1987) (per curiam); United States v.
Nagaro-Garbin, 653 F. Supp. 586, 589-90 (E.D. Mich.), affd, No. 87-1148, 1987 WL 44483
(6th Cir. Oct. 20, 1987).
73 See, e.g., Santos v. Kolb, 880 F.2d 941, 944 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. George,
869 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1989).
74 See, e.g., Torrey v. Estelle, 842 F.2d 234, 236-37 (9th Cir. 1988).
75 See, e.g., Varela v. Kaiser, 976 F.2d 1357 (10th Cir. 1992).
76 See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 768-69 (l1th Cir. 1985).
77 See, e.g., United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
78 See, e.g., United States v. Berumen, 24 M.J. 737, 739-43 (A.C.M.R. 1987).
79 See, e.g., Matos v. United States, 631 A.2d 28, 31-32 (D.C. 1993).
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rule, as have courts in Alabama,80 Alaska,8' Arizona,8 2 California,8 3
Connecticut,84 Delaware, 85 Florida,86 Georgia,87 Idaho,88 Illinois,89 In-
diana,90 Iowa,91 Kansas,92 Maine, 93 Maryland,94 Massachusetts, 95 Mich-
igan,96 Minnesota,97 Missouri,98 Nevada,99 New Hampshire, 100 New
Jersey,10 1 New Mexico, 10 2 New York,103 North Carolina,10 4 North Da-
kota, 10 5 Pennsylvania, 10 6 Rhode Island,10 7 South Carolina, 0 8 South
80 See, e.g., Fearson v. State, 662 So. 2d 1225 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995); Oyekoya v. State,
558 So. 2d 990 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989).
81 See, e.g., Tafoya v. State, 500 P.2d 247 (Alaska 1972).
82 See, e.g., State v. Rosas, 904 P.2d 1245 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (citing State v. Vera, 766
P.2d 110, 112 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988)).
83 See, e.g., People v. Reed, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615 (Ct. App. 1998). But cf In re Resendiz,
19 P.3d 1171, 1179 (Cal. 2001) (concluding that "the 'collateral' nature of immigration
consequences does not foreclose" an ineffective assistance of counsel claim); infra notes
122-24 and accompanying text.
84 See, e.g., Ferreira v. Comm'r of Corr., No. CV 980002810, 1999 WL 203795 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Apr. 1, 1999).
85 See, e.g., State v. Christie, 655 A.2d 836, 841 (Del. Super. Ct.), affid, No. 252, 1994,
1994 WL 734468 (Del. 1994).
86 See, e.g., State v. Ginebra, 511 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 1987) (disapproving of the holding in
Edwards v. State, 393 So. 2d 597, 599-600 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)), superseded by rule as
stated in State v. De Abreu, 613 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 1993).
87 See, e.g., Williams v. Duffy, 513 S.E.2d 212, 214 (Ga. 1999); King v. State, 539 S.E.2d
614, 616-17 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
88 See, e.g., Ray v. State, 982 P.2d 931, 937 (Idaho 1999).
89 See, e.g., People v. Huante, 571 N.E.2d 736, 740-42 (111. 1991) (disapproving People
v. Maranovic, 559 N.E.2d 126 (Il. App. Ct. 1990); People v. Miranda, 540 N.E.2d 1008 (II.
App. Ct. 1989); People v. Padilla, 502 N.E.2d 1182 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)).
90 See, e.g., Stoltz v. State, 657 N.E.2d 188, 192-93 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
91 See, e.g., State v. Carney, 584 N.W.2d 907, 910 (Iowa 1998) (en banc) (per curiam);
Mott v. State, 407 N.W.2d 581 (Iowa 1987).
92 See, e.g., Bussell v. State, 963 P.2d 1250, 1253-54 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998).
93 See, e.g., Aldus v. State, 748 A.2d 463, 469 n.6 (Me. 2000) ("There is a sound basis
for the collateral consequences doctrine. Neither courts nor defense counsel can be ex-
pected to be aware of the multitude of potential consequences that may flow from a
conviction.").
94 See, e.g., Yoswvick v. State, 700 A.2d 251, 258-59 (Md. 1997) (Raker, J.).
95 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Indelicato, 667 N.E.2d 300 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996).
96 See, e.g., People v. Davidovich, 618 N.W.2d 579 (Mich. 2000) (per curiam) (overrul-
ing People v. Kadadu, 425 N.W.2d 784 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988)); cf. People v. Osaghae, 596
N.W.2d 911, 914 (Mich. 1999) (per curiam) (holding that counsel has no duty to predict
changes in law).
97 See, e.g., Berkow v. State, 583 N.W.2d 562, 563-64 (Minn. 1998) (citing Alanis v.
State, 583 N.W.2d 573 (Minn. 1998)).
98 See, e.g., Redeemer v. State, 979 S.W.2d 565, 572-73 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
99 See, e.g., Barajas v. State, 991 P.2d 474 (Nev. 1999) (per curiam).
100 See, e.g., State v. Elliott, 574 A.2d 1378 (N.H. 1990) (Souter, J.).
101 See, e.g., State v. Chung, 510 A.2d 72 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
102 See, e.g., State v. Miranda, 675 P.2d 422, 424-25 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).
103 See, e.g., People v. Ford, 657 N.E.2d 265, 267-68 (N.Y. 1995).
104 See, e.g., State v. Goforth, 503 S.E.2d 676, 678 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
105 See, e.g., State v. Dalman, 520 N.W.2d 860, 864 (N.D. 1994).
106 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Frometa, 555 A.2d 92 (Pa. 1989).
107 See, e.g., State v. Alejo, 655 A.2d 692 (R.I. 1995).
108 See, e.g., Smith v. State, 494 S.E.2d 626, 629 (S.C. 1997).
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Dakota, 10 9 Tennessee,11 0  Texas,"' Utah,112 Washington, 113 and
Wisconsin."14
With respect to the collateral consequence of deportation in par-
ticular, there is some diversity of opinion. Courts in Colorado, 1 5 Indi-
ana, 116 Ohio, 117 and Oregon 18 have held that aliens may be entitled
to advice about deportation from their lawyers, some possibly on state
law grounds. A growing number of states require advice about depor-
tation by statute or court rule." 9 Some courts have also held that
while counsel generally need not be concerned about collateral conse-
quences, the federal statute which until 1990 authorized state and fed-
eral judges to issue a binding 'Judicial Recommendation Against
Deportation" at sentencing imposed a duty of care on attorneys.'2 0
Many courts also hold or suggest that misadvice about deportation or
other collateral consequences might be treated differently than non-
advice.' 2 '
One potential outlier is a California Supreme Court decision
holding that collateral consequences are not categorically excluded
from ineffectiveness analysis. 122 However, the case was a deportation
case involving alleged affirmative misrepresentations. 2 3 Moreover,
109 See, e.g., State v. Wika, 464 N.W.2d 630, 633-34 (S.D. 1991).
110 See, e.g., Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d 334, 350 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).
111 See, e.g., Ex parte Morrow, 952 S.W.2d 530, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc).
112 See, e.g., State v. McFadden, 884 P.2d 1303 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
113 See, e.g., State v. Martinez-Lazo, 999 P.2d 1275, 1279 (Wash. CL App.), review denied,
11 P.3d 827 (Wash. 2000).
114 See, e.g., State v. Santos, 401 N.W.2d 856 (Wis. CL App. 1987).
115 See, e.g., People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 527 (Colo. 1987) (en banc).
116 See, e.g., Williams v. State, 641 N.E.2d 44, 49 (Ind. CL App. 1994) (holding that state
constitution requires advice about deportation).
117 See, e.g., State v. Arvanitis, 522 N.E.2d 1089, 1094-95 (Ohio CL App. 1986).
118 See, e.g., Lyons v. Pearce, 694 P.2d 969, 971 n.2, 974-77 (Or. 1985) (en banc).
119 See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 2291 n.48 (2001) (listing rules and statutes);
Christina LaBrie, Lack of Uniformity in the Deportation of Criminal Aliens, 25 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 357, 373 & n.93 (1999) (listing state statutes).
120 See United States v. Castro, 26 F.3d 557, 560-61 (5th Cir. 1994); Janvier v. United
States, 793 F.2d 449, 455 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Khalaf, 116 F. Supp. 2d 210,
213-15 (D. Mass. 1999); People v. Barocio, 264 Cal. Rptr. 573, 579 (Ct. App. 1989); People
v. Ping Cheung, 718 N.Y.S.2d 578, 582-83 (Sup. CL 2000); cf Hameed v. Commonwealth,
No. 114207, 1992 WL 884664 (Va. Cir. Ct. May 7, 1992) (no ineffective assistance of coun-
sel on facts).
121 See, e.g., Sandoval v. INS, 240 F.3d 577, 578-79 (7th Cir. 2001); Hill v. Lockhart, 894
F.2d 1009 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc); Sparks v. Sowders, 852 F.2d 882, 885 (6th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Strader v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 61,
65 (4th Cir. 1979); People v. Soriano (In re Soriano), 240 Cal. Rptr. 328 (CL App. 1987);
People v. Garcia, 815 P.2d 937, 942-43 (Colo. 1991) (en banc); Roberti v. State, 782 So. 2d
919 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 2001); Smith v. Gaither, 549 S.E.2d 351, 352 (Ga. 2001) (Sears, J.,
dissenting); People v. Correa, 485 N.E.2d 307, 311 (Ill. 1985); State v. Vieira, 760 A.2d 840,
843 (NJ. Super. CL Law Div. 2000).
122 In re Resendiz, 19 P.3d 1171, 1179-84 (Cal. 2001).
123 Id. at 1184-86. The court's holding was quite narrow: "[W]e conclude that neither
[the California statute requiring court advisement of immigration consequences] nor the
[Vol. 87:697
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
the court ultimately denied relief because, even assuming the law and
facts were as the defendant alleged, any error was harmless.124 Ac-
cordingly, it may still be accurate to say that no jurisdiction has re-
jected the general principle that counsel need not consider collateral
consequences in advising clients about guilty pleas.
B. Assistance of Counsel
The collateral consequences rule is surprising in light of the Su-
preme Court's jurisprudence on the right to counsel and effective as-
sistance of counsel. Reversing the English common law practice, 125
the Sixth Amendment guarantees that in "all criminal prosecutions"
the accused may have "the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 26
In addition to protecting the right to hire counsel,127 the Amendment
has been construed to require appointment of counsel in some cir-
cumstances for those unable to afford their own lawyers. In Powell v.
Alabama,128 a 1932 decision, the Supreme Court held that the right to
counsel applied to the states and recognized that it required appoint-
ment of counsel, in capital cases, for poor defendants. 129 The right is
now recognized in felony prosecutions, 130 misdemeanors where im-
prisonment is imposed, 3 1 juvenile prosecutions, 13 2 and initial appeals
from convictions.' 33 For purposes of the Sixth Amendment, the
Court has held that a "criminal prosecution" begins with the com-
mencement of formal adversary proceedings. 34 Once proceedings
collateral nature of immigration consequences constitutes a per se bar to an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim based on counsel's misadvice about the adverse immigration
consequences of a guilty plea." Id. at 1183.
124 Id. at 1187-88.
125 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 823-24 (1975) (citing 1 SIRJAMES FITZJAMFS
STEPHEN, A HisToRY OF THE CIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 340-41 (London, MacMillian & Co.
1883)).
126 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
127 See Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, Can a Reasonable Doubt Have an Unreasonable
Price? Limitations on Attorneys'Fees in Criminal Cases, 41 B.C. L. Ruv. 1, 57-65 (1999).
128 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
129 a at 67-68, 73.
130 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (holding that counsel is re-
quired for all state felony prosecutions, overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942),
which had adopted a case-by-case approach for state felony prosecutions); Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938) (requiring counsel for all federal felony prosecutions).
131 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36-38 (1972). Counsel need not be appointed
in a misdemeanor prosecution if imprisonment is not actually imposed upon conviction.
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979).
132 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
133 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956)). Appointed counsel is not required for discretionary appeals or petitions for certi-
orari. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974).
134 See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977).
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have commenced, counsel must be provided at critical stages,135 in-
cluding pleading,1 36 trial, and sentencing.13 7
The Powell Court implicitly also recognized a right to effective as-
sistance of counsel because in that case attorneys had technically been
appointed for the defendants. Because those attorneys apparently did
literally nothing in the way of a defense, the Court concluded that the
defendants' right to counsel had not been satisfied.' 38 However, the
Court did not replicate its steady and clear development of rules for
when counsel was required in the area of effective assistance. Until
1984, the Court left the development of constitutional competence
standards to the states and lower federal courts, resulting, not surpris-
ingly, in a variety of approaches. Courts disagreed on whether viola-
tion of the right to effective counsel required automatic reversal, was
subject to the rule of Chapman v. Californial3 9 (which allowed the pros-
ecution to avoid reversal if a constitutional error could be proved
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt),140 or if the defendant could
have a new trial only on a showing of prejudice. 41 In addition, courts
disagreed about whether the substantive standard required attorneys
to exercise "'reasonable competence"' or "'customary skill,"' or
whether they would be deemed effective unless their representation
rendered the proceedings a "'farce and mockery of justice."' 42
The Supreme Court resolved these questions in Strickland v.
Washington.143 The Court explained that "[lt] he benchmark for judg-
ing any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that
the trial cannot be relied on as having produced ajust result."' 44 The
Court established a two-pronged test to evaluate claims of ineffective
counsel: A defendant must show that his lawyer's representation was
deficient (the "performance" prong), and that the deficient perform-
ance affected the outcome (the "prejudice" prong).145
The Court explained that the first prong, effective performance,
means performance by counsel that is "reasonable considering all the
135 Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967).
136 See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985).
137 See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358
(1977) (plurality opinion) ("[S]entencing is a critical stage of the criminal proceeding at
which [the defendant] is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel.").
138 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 56-58 (1932).
139 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
140 Id. at 24.
141 For a discussion of the various approaches taken by the courts, see Note, Identifying
and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Criminal Defense Counsel: A New Look After United States
v. Decoster, 93 HARv. L. REv. 752, 756-58 (1980).
142 Id. at 757-58 (citations omitted).
143 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
144 Id at 686.
145 Id. at 687-96.
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circumstances." 46 Counsel is presumed to be competent,147 and the
Court recognized that a lawyer may choose to ignore customary norms
for tactical reasons. 148 Each ineffectiveness claim must be judged "on
the facts of the particular case."'149
The Court made unmistakably clear that bright-line rules for rep-
resentation were not part of the Sixth Amendment. "Representation
is an art, and an act or omission that is unprofessional in one case may
be sound or even brilliant in another."'50 The Court noted that
"[m]ore specific guidelines are not appropriate" because the Sixth
Amendment "relies ... on the legal profession's maintenance of stan-
dards sufficient to justify the law's presumption that counsel will fulfill
the role in the adversary process that the Amendment envisions." 151
With this in mind, the Court stated that "[f]rom counsel's function as
assistant to the defehdant derive the overarching duty to advocate the
defendant's cause and the more particular duties to consult with the
defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant in-
formed of important developments in the course of the prosecu-
tion."' 52 The Court emphasized that "[tihese basic duties neither
exhaustively define the obligations of counsel nor form a checklist for
judicial evaluation of attorney performance."'53
In addition to the absence of adequate professional performance,
to satisfy the "prejudice" prong "the defendant must show that [the
unprofessional errors] actually had an adverse effect on the de-
fense."' 54 The defendant need not show that it is more likely than not
that she would have been acquitted,155 but she "must show that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional er-
rors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."156 This
line of inquiry turns on whether, absent the error, the "factfinder
would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.' 57
Strickland involved alleged ineffectiveness in the penalty phase of
a capital prosecution and therefore was treated as a trial case, 158 but
the Court meant the competence-prejudice framework to apply when
146 Id at 688.
147 Id. at 689-91.
148 Id at 688-91.
149 &d, at 690.
150 I- at 693.
151 Id at 688.
152 Id
153 Id.
154 Id- at 693.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 694.
157 Id at 695.
158 Id. at 675-76.
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'judging any claim of ineffectiveness.' 159 In Hill v. Lockhart,'60 the
Court explained how Strickland would apply to guilty pleas. Hill
pleaded guilty after his attorney advised him that he would be eligible
for parole after serving one-third of his sentence, l6 l when in fact he
had to serve at least one-half.162 Hill sought habeas corpus, alleging
that his plea was involuntary because of counsel's misadvice.' 6 3
The Hill Court explained that a defendant "'may only attack the
voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that
the advice he received from counsel was not within the standards set
forth in McMann";16 4 that is, the validity of the defendant's claim de-
pended "on whether counsel's advice 'was within the range of compe-
tence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." ' 16 5 Thus, the Court
applied Strickland's competence prong without modification, 6 6 and
explained that to satisfy the prejudice prong, "the defendant must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's er-
rors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial."'167
C. Scrutinizing the Collateral-Direct Distinction
The distinction between direct and collateral consequences is in-
consistent with the approach of the Court in Strickland and Hill in a
number of ways. For example, Strickland emphatically rejects the
checklist, insisting on case-by-case analysis, an approach at odds with
the collateral consequences rule's categorical approach. a6 8 More fun-
damentally, the first prong of Strickland-Hill analysis requires evaluat-
ing attorney competence. The collateral consequences rule does not
capture, even as a rule of thumb, anything important about the con-
cerns of competent lawyers or their clients. Because competent coun-
sel will not focus on the distinction, it should be irrelevant to a
Strickland analysis.
159 Id. at 686-87.
160 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
161 Id at 54-55.
162 Id at 55.
163 Id at 53.
164 Id. at 56-57 (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (citing Mc-
Mann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970))).
165 Id at 56 (quoting McMann, 397 U.S. at 771).
166 Id at 58-59.
167 Id at 59.
168 Cf Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 479-81 (2000) (rejecting bright-line rule
with respect to counsel's duty to file notice of appeal).
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1. The Supreme Court, ABA Standards, and Other Evidence of
Lawyer Norms
The first prong of the Strickland inquiry requires evaluation of the
competence of the attorney's performance. In this context, the ques-
tion is whether competent attorneys would ignore collateral conse-
quences in advising defendants how to proceed. Almost certainly
without intending to do so, the Supreme Court seems to have an-
swered this question in a deportation case, INS v. St. Cyr.'69
The issue in St. Cyr was whether the repeal of section 212(c) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act 170 applied retroactively. 171 Sec-
tion 212(c) provided for discretionary relief from deportation of
aliens convicted of certain crimes. 172 Congress repealed section
212(c) in 1996, but St. Cyr argued that aliens who pleaded guilty
before then did so in part because section 212(c) relief was available,
and thus that the repeal should apply only to subsequent convic-
tions. 173 The Court held that Congress had not intended the repeal
to apply to past convictions. 174 The Court recognized that aliens con-
sider the collateral consequence of deportation in deciding whether
to plead guilty, and competent defense counsel take it into account in
rendering advice. The Court explained, "[tihere can be little doubt
that, as a general matter, alien defendants considering whether to
enter into a plea agreement are acutely aware of the immigration con-
sequences of their convictions."1 75 Relying on the ABA Standards176
and other practitioner's materials, the Court observed that "[e]ven if
the defendant were not initially aware of § 212(c), competent defense
counsel, following the advice of numerous practice guides, would
have advised him concerning the provision's importance."'177
The St. Cyr Court's exploration of the duties of competent coun-
sel did not arise in the context of a Sixth Amendment case, but it
nevertheless used the appropriate sources. In Strickland, the Court
mentioned only one source by name as evidence of the nature of com-
petent practice. The Court explained that "[pirevailing norms of
practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the
like, e.g., ABA Standards for Criminal Justice .... are guides to deter-
169 121 S. Ct. 2271 (2001).
170 Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(c), 66 Stat. 163, 187 (1952).
171 St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2275.
172 Id. at 2276.
'73 Id. at 2290-93.
174 Id. at 2293.
175 Id. at 2291.
176 1& at 2291 n.48 (quoting STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE, Standard 14-3.2 cmt. at
14-75 (1980)).
177 M at 2291 n.50.
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mining what is reasonable, but they are only guides."1 78 The Court
has frequently cited the ABA Standards in evaluating attorney
performance. 179
The ABA Standards for CriminalJustice explicitly require defense
counsel to explore collateral consequences with the client as part of
representation in a guilty plea. Standard 14-3.2(f) explains: "[t]o the
extent possible, defense counsel should determine and advise the de-
fendant, sufficiently in advance of the entry of any plea, as to the pos-
sible collateral consequences that might ensue from entry of the
contemplated plea."'180 The comments recognize that because of "the
ever-increasing host of collateral consequences that may flow from a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere, it may be very difficult for defense
counsel to fully brief every client on every likely effect of a plea in all
circumstances." 181 However, because the defendant
will frequently have little appreciation of the full range of conse-
quences that may follow from a guilty, nolo or Alford plea[,] ....
counsel should interview the client to determine what collateral
consequences are likely to be important to a client given the client's
particular personal circumstances and the charges the client
faces. 182
Although Standard 14-3.2(f) was added as part of the 1997 revi-
sion of the guilty plea standards, it is consistent with the 1980 version,
which imposed similar duties, 183 as well as with other ABA Standards
and ethical rules which have been in existence for decades. For exam-
ple, Standard 4-5.1 provides that "[a]fter informing himself or herself
fully on the facts and the law, the lawyer should advise the accused
with complete candor concerning all aspects of the case, including a
178 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
179 See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000) (citing STANDARDS FOR CRIMi-
NALJUSTIcE, Standard 4-4.1 cmt. at 4-55 (1986)); Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 479
(2000) (citing STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION, Standard 4-8.2(a) (1993)); see also Bonin v. California, 494 U.S. 1039, 1041
(1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting STANDARDS FOR CRIMi-
NAL JusTIcE, Standard 4-3.4 (1986)).
180 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY, Standard 14-3.2(f) (1999).
181 Id. cmt. at 126.
182 Id at 127.
183 The 1980 edition of the ABA Standards provided that counsel should advise "of
considerations deemed important by defense counsel or the defendant in reaching a deci-
sion." Id. Standard 14-3.2(b) (1986). The comments explained: "Where from the nature
of the case it is apparent that these consequences may follow ... or where the defendant
raises a specific question concerning collateral consequences.., counsel should fully ad-
vise the defendant of these consequences." Id cmt. at 14-75. A number of cases rely on
Standard 14-3.2 (b) in finding counsel ineffective for failing to advise of consequences. See,
e.g., People v. Barocio, 264 Cal. Rptr. 573, 577-78 (Ct. App. 1989); People v. Soriano (In re
Soriano), 240 Cal. Rptr. 328, 335-36 (Ct. App. 1987); People v. Garcia, 799 P.2d 413, 415
(Colo. Ct. App. 1990), aftd, 815 P.2d 937 (Colo. 1991).
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candid estimate of the probable outcome.' 8 4 Furthermore, Standard
4-8.1 provides that "[t]he consequences of the various dispositions
available should be explained fully by defense counsel to the ac-
cused." 18 5 The comment explains that this means "[t]he lawyer
should carefully explain to the defendant the sentencing alternatives
available to the court and what they will mean for the defendant per-
sonally should any of them be selected."1 86
Similarly, the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which
are applicable to all lawyers, support this result. They place the deci-
sion to plead in the client's hands rather than the lawyer's, and im-
pose a duty on the lawyer to discuss with the client aspects of the case
which might be relevant to the decision about how to proceed in a
particular legal matter.187 The implication is that the duty also applies
to guilty pleas.'88
The ideas expressed in these materials are consistent with trea-
tises and practitioners' guides, which emphasize the importance of
understanding collateral consequences as part of evaluating criminal
cases. Professor Anthony Amsterdam's Trial Manual for the Defense of
Criminal Cases explains:
No intelligent plea decision can be made by either lawyer or
client without full understanding of the possible consequences of a
conviction. These consequences describe the defendant's potential
exposure if s/he goes to trial and is convicted of the offense
184 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE, Standard 4-5.1 (1986). The commentary to this
Standard makes even more apparent the intention of the drafters. It states that "[t~he duty
of the lawyer to investigate fully the facts of the case, regardless of the anticipated plea ....
[and the] lawyer's duty to be informed on the law [are] equally important... [for] the
client is not [likely to be] educated in or familiar with the controlling law." Id. cmt. at 4-63.
Further, "[t]he decision to plead guilty can be an intelligent one only if the defendant has
been advised fully as to his or her rights and as to the probable outcome of alternative
choices." I&
185 I Standard 4-8.1(a).
186 1L cmt. at 4-103.
187 MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDuCT R. 1.1 cmt. [5] (2001) ("Competent handling of
a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of
the problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent
practitioners."); i- R 1.2(a) ("A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the
objectives of representation .... ."); id. R. 1.2(c) ("A lawyer may limit the objectives of the
representation if the client consents after consultation.").
188 Cf id. IL 1.4(b) ("A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary
to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation."); MODEL
CODE OF PROF'L RmsPoNsiBiLrr EC 7-8 (1980) ("A lawyer should exert his best efforts to
insure that decisions of his client are made only after the client has been informed of
relevant considerations.... A lawyer should advise his client of the possible effect of each
legal alternative."); see also MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 ("In representing a
client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid ad-
vice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations
such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's
situation.").
2002]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
charged or if s/he pleads guilty to the offense charged with no plea
bargain. They are the baseline for measuring the worth of any bar-
gain that can be negotiated; and if the prosecutor will not negotiate
they measure the worth of the defendant's chances of acquittal or of
conviction only of a lesser included offense.., at a trial. In some
defendant's cases the consequences of conviction may be so devas-
tating that even the faintest ray of hope offered by a trial is magni-
fied in significance. 189
Professor Arthur Campbell notes in his treatise that "there are
collateral effects which extend far beyond the courthouse. Counsel's
professional duties include giving sound advice concerning them."'9 0
The BNA Criminal Practice Manual suggests that "[w] hile minimi-
zation of jail time immediately leaps to mind as a primary benefit of
plea bargaining and thus a primary goal of the client, there is a myriad
of other goals and concerns that may pertain."'' It recommends in-
vestigating a variety of collateral consequences, including alternative
sentencing, enhanced sentencing, eligibility for parole or probation,
forfeiture, and "[r]amifications of conviction on client's livelihood,
e.g., a conviction may prevent renewal of a pharmacist's license or be
a bar to holding elective office."' 9 2
Other general criminal practitioners' materials note the impor-
tance of advising clients about the collateral consequences of convic-
tion, 19 as do materials in specialized areas of criminal practice such as
189 1 AMSTERDAM, supra note 1, § 204.
190 ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 15:23, at 406 (2d ed. 1991).
191 BNA CRIMINAL PRACTICE MANUAL, at 71:103 (1996).
192 Id. at 71:105.
193 Notable among these are attorney performance guidelines promulgated by public
defender organizations, which often require consideration of collateral consequences. See,
e.g, 2 BUREAU OFJUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF STANDARDS FOR
INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS: STANDARDS FOR ATTORNEY PERFORMANCE, at H11-H15 (2000);
see also, e.g, F. LEE BAILEY & KENNETHJ. FISHMAN, HANDLING MISDEMEANOR CASES § 3.7, at 5
(2d ed. 1992) ("In misdemeanor cases, the possible consequences of a conviction may be
so drastic that the defendant must take his or her chances on a trial."); G. NICHOLAS HER-
MAN, PLEA BARGAINING § 3.03, at 20-21 (1997) ("Throughout the plea bargaining process,
defense counsel should advise the defendant of the following: ... All of the consequences
and ramifications of a particular plea, including possible sentences and effects on proba-
tion, parole eligibility, immigration status, and the like." (footnote omitted)); NEWMAN,
supra note 2, at 209 (arguing that counsel must have "intimate knowledge" of potential
collateral consequences in order to be effective); Elkan Abramowitz, The Hidden Penalties of
Conviction, LITIGATION, Fall 1990, at 34, 34 ("To the defense attorney goes the lonelyjob of
anticipating collateral consequences, weighing them with the client, and ultimately help-
ing the client to decide whether to enter a plea."); Clark, supra note 1, at 19-20 (stating
that defense counsel "should also advise the defendant of at least some of the collateral
effects of a plea of guilty, such as loss of the right to vote or loss of the right to obtain
certain types of employment"); Robert L. Segar, Plea Bargaining Techniques, 25 AM. JUR.
TRIALS 69, § 19, at 103-04 (1978) (noting that understanding potential damage to client as
a result of conviction "might bring about a prosecutor's agreement to a dismissal" or, alter-
natively, "prompt an accused to seriously undertake plea negotiations"); id. § 21 (describ-
ing possible "adverse consequences" and concluding that "counsel must ensure that all
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environmental law,' 94 white collar crime, 19 5 and tax.196 Even cases
that have refused to hold that counsel have the obligation to discuss
collateral consequences with clients recognize that it represents better
practice.' 97
possible adverse consequences are explored with the defendant well before entry of a
guilty plea"); id. § 51, at 141 (including, in a "checklist" for advising a client regarding a
guilty plea, an explanation of potential probation and parole consequences of a convic-
tion, as well as the potential for consecutive sentencing); RodneyJ. Uphoff, The Criminal
Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systemic Approach, 2 CLINICAL L. REv. 73, 100 (1995)
("[lilt is critical that defense counsel inquire about the defendant's personal situation so
counsel can advise the client about the collateral consequences of a guilty plea or convic-
tion."); Melinda Smith, Comment, Criminal Defense Attorneys and Non-Citizen Clients: Under-
standing Immigrants, Basic Immigration Law & How Recent Changes in Those Laws May Affect
Your Criminal Cases, 33 AKRON L. REv. 163, 207 (1999) ("[lt is imperative that criminal
defense attorneys become aware of the immigration status of their clients, and the immi-
gration issues involved in each criminal case."); George Beall, Negotiating the Disposition of
Criminal Charges, TRiAL, Oct. 1980, at 46, 48 ("If the defendant is about to plead guilty,
prepare him or her for the non-criminal consequences of that choice."); Laurie L. Levin-
son, Representing Aliens, N.J. L.J., May 17, 1999, at 37 ("Defense counsel who represent
clients who have either violated the immigration laws or whose convictions affect their
immigration status have added responsibilities in providing such representation.").
194 See, e.g., David P. Bancroft, The Collateral Estoppel and Caremark Consequences of Crimi-
nal Convictions in Environmental Cases, in CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAwS
137, 145-46 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, No. SE72, 2000) ("To limit the possible impact on
subsequent or parallel civil lawsuits, counsel should... negotiate ... related issues [as part
of a plea bargain]."), available at Westlaw SE72 ALI-ABA 137; Carol E. Dinkins, Negotiation
and Settlement Issues in Federal Enforcement Actions, in ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 1405, 1420
(ALI-ABA Course of Study, No. C127, 1995) ("Because the collateral consequences of a
conviction-such as listing to bar contracting with the federal government-can be more
severe punishment than a fine, practitioners must be wary of them."), available at Westiaw
C127 ALI-ABA 1405; Judson W. Starr & Valerie K. Mann, Just when You Thought It Was
Safe-The Collateral Consequences of an Environmental Violation, in HAzARDous WAsms,
SUPERFUND, AND Toxic SutsTANcES 265, 280 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, No. CA51, 1995)
("A party defending against environmental liability must be on the lookout to avoid being
blind-sided by collateral consequences of a conviction."), available at Westlaw CA51 ALI-
ABA 265.
195 See, e.g., David M. Zornow et al., Managing the Fallout: The Criminal Investigator's
Knock on the Door May Only Be the First of Many, in "CRIMINALIZATION" OF CIVI. LAv CLAIMs
127, 129 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, No. C640, 1991) ("In dealing with a criminal investiga-
tion, no tactical or strategic decision should be made by a corporation without careful
consideration of its impact on a range of other potential proceedings and collateral is-
sues."), available at Westlaw C640 ALI-ABA 127.
196 See, e.g., Robert S. Fink & Martha P. Rogers, Trial of a Tax Fraud Case in CRIMiNAL
TAx FRAu--1997, at H-11, H-18 (Section of Taxation, Am. Bar Ass'n Ctr. for Continuing
Legal Educ., Nat'l Inst., 1997) ("A convicted tax evader faces collateral consequences
... ."), available at Westiaw N97CTFB ABA-LGLED H-11.
197 See, e.g., United States v. Banda, 1 F.3d 354, 356 (5th Cir. 1993) ("This is not to say
that [counsel] should not advise the client on possible deportation-[counsel] should.");
United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 769 (11th Cir. 1985) ("It is highly desirable that
both state and federal counsel develop the practice of advising defendants of the collateral
consequences of pleading guilty; what is desirable is not the issue before us."). The Camp-
bell case is frequently cited. Its refusal to consider "what is desirable" may be an acknowl-
edgement that its holding is based on something other than the actual practices of good
lawyers, which should be a necessary part of evaluating lawyer competence. See State v.
Ramirez, Nos. 109, 00-0393, 2001 WL 1035928, at *5 (Iowa Sept. 6, 2001) ("[F]oreign-
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
It is not surprising that the ABA materials and other resources
should speak with one voice about collateral consequences. The
harmful implications for the client's case and the lawyer's reputation
for categorically ignoring collateral consequences are readily accessi-
ble to any lawyer. Imagine an applicant for a position in a law firm's
white collar or regulatory department stating:
I would advise a client to accept a plea bargain to a count with a
$1,000 fine rather than to a count with a $2,000 fine even if it later
turned out that conviction on the first count resulted in debarment
from participation in federal programs or termination of a license
necessary to do business, and the second one would not have. Just
as I would not presume to tell the client not to use the $1,000 saved
in the first plea to buy fried foods, and instead to invest it in a diver-
sified portfolio of mutual funds to help ensure a secure retirement,
evaluation of collateral consequences is simply not part of the re-
sponsibilities of a good lawyer.
Consider this hypothetical "war story" of an applicant for a posi-
tion at a public defender's office:
I represented someone charged with DUI, and due to my excellent
advocacy the prosecutor accepted a guilty plea with a one-day sen-
tence instead of the three days imposed in almost every similar case.
As an interesting aside, my client and his family were then deported
based on the conviction; I have no idea whether I could have nego-
tiated a deal resulting in conviction of a non-deportable offense;
status as an alien does not affect the fine or length of incarceration,
so I never considered it. The results of this case demonstrate my
remarkable legal abilities.
Obviously, lawyers who ignore collateral consequences of legal actions
are, to that extent, bad lawyers. Whether clients are regarded by indi-
vidual attorneys as sources of fees, as the objects of duty and concern,
or both, lawyers whose concept of practice predictably results in seri-
ous avoidable harm would and should be unemployable. If this is cor-
rect, the model of competence suggested by the collateral
consequences rule is inconsistent with what most lawyers and clients
would regard as competence.
2. Collateral Consequences and Plea Negotiations
Understanding collateral consequences helps lawyers and their
clients evaluate the risks and benefits of taking or rejecting a particu-
lar plea. A lawyer can also use her knowledge of collateral conse-
quences to change what the risks and benefits are: Identifying and
explaining collateral consequences to the prosecutor or court may in-
national defendants should be apprised of all applicable federal laws, especially federal de-
portation consequences of state guilty pleas.").
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fluence the decision to bring charges at all, the particular charges that
are brought, the counts to which the court or prosecution accept a
plea, and the direct consequences imposed by the court at sentencing.
The collateral consequences rule is troubling, then, because it as-
sumes that competent counsel can systematically ignore a significant
share of the resources they may be able to deploy on behalf of their
clients.
As one practitioners' guide explained:
Attention should be paid to the collateral effects of a convic-
tion under the prosecutor's theories. The impact of collateral con-
sequences due to a criminal conviction can, on occasion, be used to
persuade the prosecutor to prosecute for a lesser charge or to de-
cline a case altogether. During negotiations, defense counsel can
cite to the draconian nature of the collateral consequences to show
that a conviction would be overly punitive. 198
Professor Campbell has suggested:
Before actually starting to bargain, the need for counsel's prior,
thorough, and wide ranging investigation into the facts of the case
and client's life history cannot be overemphasized. There is much
material which, though inadmissible at trial, can be highly signifi-
cant in persuading a prosecutor to reduce counts or sentence de-
mands-and sometimes drop charges altogether. 199
Similarly, the BNA Criminal Practice Manual suggests:
In addition to the bargaining chips relating to charges or sen-
tencing, chips of various colors held by either side allow for innova-
tive arrangements . . . that satisfy both sides, even though
unconventional.... [T]he defendant can offer to do something
that the government could not compel and yet which would assuage
one of its burning concerns. Thus, if the government's main desire
is to get the defendant off the street, a voluntary exile may fill the
bill .... A concern that the defendant's precarious mental state
198 Judson W. Starr & Valerie K. Mann, Environmental Crimes: Parallel Proceedings and
Beyond, in ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 1051, 1054 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, No. C921,
1994), available at Wesflaw C921 ALI-ABA 1051; see alsoJerrold M. Ladar, Insult Added to
Injury: Extended Fallout from a Federal Conviction, in CRImiNAL TAX FRAuD--1997, supra note
196, at D-25, D-26 ("[Collateral consequences] can affect your negotiations with the prose-
cutor as to specific charges, charging language and plea agreement conditions."), available
at Westlaw N97CTFB ABA-LGLED D-25; seeJudson W. Starr & Valerie K. Mann, Beware of
the Collateral Consequences of an Environmental Violation, in HAzARDOUS WASTES, SUPERFUND,
AND Toxic SuBsTANcEs 753, 755 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, No. C948, 1994) (claiming that
"[a]t a minimum, collateral consequences must be included in the calculation of full expo-
sure to liability so the proper level of attention is devoted to the matter [because] [b] road
understanding of the consequences collateral to an environmental violation is essential to
responsible, effective lawyering" and proposing that "[t]he defending party can affect the
likelihood, scope and impact of collateral consequences, and should be proactive in reduc-
ing these complicating factors"), available at Westlaw C948 ALI-ABA 753.
199 CAMPBELL, supra note 190, § 15.4, at 376.
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may lead to further criminal difficulty may be met by a voluntary
commitment. 200
Many other commentators agree.2 01
This advice is more than wishful thinking about the good nature
of prosecutors. The National Prosecution Standards promulgated by
the National District Attorneys Association, for example, give ample
room for consideration of collateral consequences by prosecutors ex-
ercising discretion. The standards note that "[u]ndue hardship
caused to the accused," the "availability of adequate civil remedies,"
and the defendant's waiver of his civil claims "against victims, wit-
nesses, law enforcement agencies and their personnel" may be consid-
ered in the decision to charge, to pursue pretrial diversion, or to take
a plea.20
2
Similarly, the Principles of Federal Prosecution in the United
States Attorney's Manual ("Manual") notes that "[m]erely because the
attorney for the government believes that a person's conduct consti-
tutes a Federal offense and that the admissible evidence will be suffi-
cient to obtain and sustain a conviction, does not mean that he/she
necessarily should initiate or recommend prosecution .... 203 In-
stead, the Manual suggests that prosecution may be declined if:
200 BNA CRIMINAL PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 191, at 71:111-12.
201 See, e.g., HERMAN, supra note 193, § 6:11, at 71 (suggesting that defense counsel
"[p]oint out the special harshness of a particular guilty plea upon the defendant and his
family (e.g., loss of employment, license, etc.)," "point out the defendant's exposure to
civil liability," and "[p]oint out the defendant's willingness and ability to make restitu-
tion"); NEWMAN, supra note 2, at 106 (explaining that because "prosecutors and judges"
recognize "that being labeled as a certain type of offender may be far more damaging to a
defendant than imposition of even the maximum sentence," charges may be reduced "to
prevent undue hardship to deserving defendants or to defendants whose actual criminal
conduct is less serious than the label of the original charge would indicate"); Segar, supra
note 193, § 20, at 105 (suggesting that an alternative to pleading guilty may be an agree-
ment for the defendant to "[1] eave the jurisdiction"); id. § 36, at 124 ("If the client indi-
cates a desire to make restitution, counsel may be able to use this fact successfully as a
bargaining point in his negotiations."); Uphoff, supra note 193, at 128 ("Counsel's ability to
strike a responsive chord with an innovative or emotional presentation may succeed in
moving a cynical prosecutor to offer a more favorable bargain.").
202 NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standards 43.6, 44.4 (Nat'l Dist. Attorneys
Ass'n 1991). The president of the National District Attorneys Association recently wrote to
his membership that "U]udges often consider the collateral consequences of a conviction,"
and argued that prosecutors also "must consider them if we are to see that justice is
done .... [P]rosecutors... must comprehend [the] full range of consequences that flow
from a ... conviction. If not, we will suffer the disrespect and lose the confidence of the
very society we seek to protect." Robert M.A. Johnson, Collateral Consequences, PROSECUTOR
(Nat'l Dist. Attorneys Ass'n, Alexandria, Va.), May/June 2001, at 5. For examples of pleas
structured by the prosecutor to avoid the collateral consequence of deportation, see Lor-
raine Forte, Chinese Couple Get Deal on Abuse Charge, CHI. SuN-TIMES, May 12, 1998, at 15;
and Jim Kirksey & PippaJack, Rockies'Astacio to Hear Deportation Ruling Today, DENVER POST,
Dec. 5, 2000, at BI.
203 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-27.220(B) (2d ed.
1997).
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1. No substantial Federal interest would be served by prosecution;
2. The person is subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdic-
tion; or
3. There exists an adequate non-criminal alternative to
prosecution.20 4
According to the Manua4 collateral consequences can be relevant to
each of these reasons.
The "adequate non-criminal alternatives" category contemplates
classic collateral proceedings; "civil tax proceedings; civil actions
under the securities, customs, antitrust, or other regulatory laws; and
reference of complaints to licensing authorities or to professional or-
ganizations such as bar associations. Another potentially useful alter-
native to prosecution in some cases is pretrial diversion."20 5 The
Manual states:
Attorneys for the government should familiarize themselves
with these alternatives and should consider pursuing them if they
are available in a particular case. Although on some occasions they
should be pursued in addition to the criminal law procedures, on
other occasions they can be expected to provide an effective substi-
tute for criminal prosecution.20 6
If collateral proceedings are relevant to federal prosecutors, either as
add-ons or in lieu of criminal charges, it is hard to see why competent
defense lawyers who are negotiating with the government should con-
sider them categorically irrelevant.
The rules for evaluating whether there is a substantial federal in-
terest-another ground for declining to prosecute-also recognize
that collateral consequences may be relevant. The Manual takes into
account "[t]he probable sentence or other consequences if the per-
son is convicted."20 7 The comment to that section recognizes that
"the personal circumstances of an accused may be relevant in deter-
mining whether to prosecute or take other action. Some circum-
stances peculiar to the accused, such as extreme youth, advanced age,
or mental or physical impairment, may suggest that prosecution is not
the most appropriate response to his/her offense."20 8 In determining
whether to defer to prosecution in another jurisdiction, the prosecu-
tor "should ... be alert to the possibility that a conviction under state
law may, in some cases result in collateral consequences for the defen-
dant, such as disbarment, that might not follow upon a conviction
under Federal law."20 9
204 Id § 9-27.220(A).
205 Id § 9-27.250(B).
206 Id
207 Id- § 9-27.230(A) (7).
208 Id. § 9-27.230(B) (7).
209 1& § 9-27.240(B) (3).
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Collateral consequences can also affect the sentence under the
United States Sentencing Guidelines. In the federal system, a court is
required to impose a fine "in all cases" unless the defendant is and will
be unable to pay.210 In calculating the fine, the court is required to
consider "any restitution or reparation that the defendant has made
or is obligated to make"211 and "any collateral consequences of convic-
tion, including civil obligations arising from the defendant's con-
duct."21 2 Deportation is another frequently encountered collateral
consequence. Apparently, all of the circuits that have considered the
issue have held that consent to deportation can in some circumstances
warrant a downward departure from the recommended sentence, per-
mitted under Guideline 5K2.0. 2 13
In guideline jurisdictions, the existence of compelling collateral
consequences might affect where a sentence falls within the range, or
even the range itself. In traditional systems, where 'Judges have virtu-
ally unlimited discretion regarding the information they may con-
sider,"214 the ability to make a sympathetic argument may be even
more important. Thus, courts have taken into account potential or
actual loss of employment as a sentencing factor,215 and have imposed
sentences based on consideration of collateral consequences such as
deportation. 216
Sixth Amendment questions are ordinarily raised in the context
of specific cases. An individual attorney's failure to consider collateral
210 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5E1.2(a) (2000).
211 Id. § 5E1.2(d) (4).
212 Id. § 5E1.2(d) (5).
213 See, e.g., United States v. Arefin, No. 99-3448, 2000 WL 977303, at *4 n.3 (6th Cir.
July 6, 2000); United States v. Galvez-Falconi, 174 F.3d 255, 256 (2d Cir. 1999); United
States v. Marin-Castaneda, 134 F.3d 551, 555-56 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Farouil,
124 F.3d 838, 847 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Clase-Espinal, 115 F.3d 1054, 1060 (1st
Cir. 1997); United States v. Flores-Uribe, 106 F.3d 1485, 1486 (9th Cir. 1997); United States
v. Cruz-Ochoa, 85 F.3d 325 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Smith, 27 F.3d 649, 655 (D.C.
Cir. 1994).
214 CAMPBELL, supra note 190, § 10:1, at 306; see also 2 AMTERDAm, supra note 1,
§ 464(F) (noting that preparation for sentencing requires the lawyer to be aware of"[t]he
collateral consequences that may follow different sentencing dispositions").
215 See, e.g., People v. White, 442 N.Y.S.2d 186 (App. Div. 1981). In the militaryjustice
system, it is well established that it is permissible to take into account the potential loss of a
pension when determining a sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Boyd, 52 M.J. 758, 766
(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2000), affd, 55 MJ. 217 (C.A.A.F. 2001).
216 Mark Bixler, INS Memo to Prosecutors Called 'Despicable', ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 25,
2000, at E3 (noting that "some judges are actually lowering immigrants' sentences from 12
months to 11 months and 29 days-just low enough to avoid deportation"); Deportation
Awaits Man Freed from Jail DETROIT FREE PREss, July 8, 2000, at 1 A (reporting that a judge
agreed to an eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentence in plea bargain "because 'she be-
lieved that no one should be deported to Kosovo"); see also Rashtabadi v. INS, 23 F.3d
1562, 1568 (9th Cir. 1994) (observing that some courts would vacate sentences and resen-
tence aliens simply so that ajudicial Recommendation Against Deportation could be part
of the judgment).
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consequences in a particular case may be an appropriate strategic
choice or, if inappropriate, nonprejudicial. Accordingly, not every
failure to consider collateral consequences will warrant vacating a
plea. Nevertheless, there is a tradition of examining systemic practices
to determine whether they are consistent with the obligation of effec-
tive assistance of counsel.21 7 From the perspective of setting standards
for cases to come rather than cases already disposed of, the collateral
consequences rule is indefensible. It undermines the values underly-
ing the Sixth Amendment because it encourages defense lawyers to
disregard what, in a category of cases, will be the most promising
source of aid for their clients' position.
II
THE DocrwNAL BASIS OF THE COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES RuLE
The collateral consequences rule is remarkable because it has ap-
parently been embraced by every jurisdiction that has considered it,
yet it is inconsistent with the ABA Standards and the practices of good
lawyers as described by the Supreme Court and other authoritative
sources. Rather than distinguishing these authorities, most courts fol-
lowing the collateral consequences rule do so simply on the basis of
precedent. The typical decision following or adopting the distinction
cites a number of cases holding that counsel need not discuss collat-
eral consequences with their clients, but does not analyze either the
lawyer's conduct or the rule independently to determine if it is consis-
tent with Strickland and Hill The problem with an approach relying
primarily on precedent is that most of the leading cases are
inapposite.
This Part describes four categories of cases that are influential but
unsound. The first category applies the "farce and mockery ofjustice"
standard for ineffective assistance of counsel which the Strickland
Court rejected. On occasion, the cases in this category even question
whether ineffective assistance can ever invalidate a plea. A second cat-
egory of cases holds that because a plea is knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent (in the sense that the plea court has complied with its du-
ties), any dereliction of counsel's duty is irrelevant. A third category,
related to the second, relies on cases holding that the plea court need
only explain direct consequences, but without explaining why the du-
217 See, e.g., State v. Smith 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc) (finding an indigent
defense system unconstitutional); State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993) (same). See
generally Rodger Citron, Note, (Un)Luckey v. Miller: The Case for a Structural Injunction to
Improve Indigent Defense Services, 101 YALE L.J. 481, 493-94 (1991) (discussing the jus-
ticiabiity of systemic claims); Note, Gideon's Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform
of Indigent Defense 113 HARv. L. REv. 2062 (2000).
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ties of counsel and the court should be identical. Finally, some cases
rest on the idea that counsel's responsibility in connection with guilty
pleas is different from and lesser than the obligation owed to a client
in a case that goes to trial. Very few cases analyze the primary ques-
tion of whether non-exploration of collateral consequences is consis-
tent with the duties of competent counsel as required by Strickland
and Hill
A. Cases Applying Pre-Strickland Standards
One line of decisions holds that ineffective assistance of counsel
can never invalidate a plea, or that it can do so only if counsel's advice
rendered the proceeding "a farce and mockery of justice." These
cases continue to be widely cited even though they turn on a legal
standard that the Supreme Court rejected in Strickland. Before Strick-
land, most defendants attacking guilty pleas claimed that they were
invalid under the Due Process Clause, 218 that manifest injustice war-
ranted withdrawal of their pleas under the rules of criminal proce-
dure,219 or that the judge who accepted the guilty plea failed to follow
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 or the equivalent state proce-
dural rule designed to ensure the voluntariness of a plea.220 Claims of
ineffective assistance were usually advanced through these vehicles
rather than as independent Sixth Amendment arguments.
Before Strickland, ineffective assistance of counsel was an unprom-
ising basis upon which to attack a plea. In Edwards v. United States,22'
for example, then-Judge Warren Burger upheld a guilty plea, noting
that even in the trial context "[m] ere improvident strategy, bad tac-
tics, mistake, carelessness or inexperience do not necessarily amount
to ineffective assistance of counsel, unless taken as a whole the trial
was a 'mockery ofjustice.' 222 In the context of a guilty plea, accord-
ing to the court, lawyer incompetence would be even less likely to
invalidate a proceeding, because defendants are capable of analyzing
218 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 744 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238, 241 (1969).
219 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(d) provided, in pertinent part, that "[flf a
motion for withdrawal of a plea of guilty... is made before sentence is imposed, ... the
court may permit withdrawal of the plea upon a showing by the defendant of any fair and
just reason" and that "[a] t any later time, a plea may be set aside only on direct appeal or
by motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [federal habeas corpus]." FED. R. CIM. P. 32(d) (1987)
(current version at FED. R. CGaM. P. 32(e)). In this context, Rule 32 here means both the
former (Rule 32(d)) and present (Rule 32(e)) version of the rule in concert.
220 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 744; McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969). Rule 11
is basically a legislative enactment of existing practices in the courts. See FED. R. CaM. P. 11
advisory committee's notes.
221 256 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
222 I& at 708.
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the situation on their own and thus have a reduced need for the assis-
tance of counsel.223 In a guilty plea:
[T]he deed is his own; here there are not the baffling complexities
which require a lawyer for illumination; if voluntarily and under-
standingly made, even a layman should expect a plea of guilty to be
treated as an honest confession of guilt and a waiver of all defenses
known and unknown. And such is the law. A plea of guilty may not
be withdrawn after sentence except to correct a 'manifest injustice,'
and we find it difficult to imagine how 'manifest injustice' could be
shown except by proof that the plea was not voluntarily or under-
standingly made, or a showing that defendant was ignorant of his
right to counsel. Certainly ineffective assistance of counsel, as op-
posed to ignorance of the right to counsel, is immaterial in an at-
tempt to impeach a plea of guilty, except perhaps to the extent that
it bears on the issues of voluntariness and understanding.224
In spite of a vehement dissent by Judge Bazelon, the Edwards decision
represented the baseline before Strickland.225
United States v. Parrino,226 decided by the Second Circuit in 1954,
is another early leading case. 227 Remarkably, although Parrino's law-
yer was a former U.S. Commissioner of Immigration, the lawyer incor-
rectly advised Parrino that he could not be deported following a guilty
plea.228 The court held that this mistake did not justify withdrawal of
the plea under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.229 The court
explained that "surprise, as in the instant case, which results from er-
roneous information received from the defendant's own attorney, at
least without a clear showing of unprofessional conduct, is not
enough."230 Judge Frank dissented vigorously but in vain.231 Parrino
did not purport to interpret the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
223 Id. at 709.
224 Id at 709-10 (footnotes omitted).
225 Indeed, Edwards continues to be cited in Sixth Amendment cases. See, e.g., United
States v. Brooks, No. CRIM.A. 97-228 GK, 2000 WL 1013574, at *3 (D.D.C. July 13, 2000);
United States v. Board, No. 91-559-11 (TFH), 2000 WL 12891, at *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 2000);
Gov't of V.I. v. Pamphile, 604 F. Supp. 753, 756 (D.V.I. 1985); Corona v. State, No. A-5928,
3528, 1996 WL 740930 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 26, 1996).
226 212 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1954).
227 See Tafoya v. State, 500 P.2d 247, 250 (Alaska 1972); Budeiri, supra note 33, at 171.
228 Parrino, 212 F.2d at 921.
229 Id. at 921-22.
230 Id. at 921.
231 Id. at 925-26 (Frank, J., dissenting).
To be sure, as my colleagues say, a court does not represent "that the mem-
bers of its bar are infallible." But it does, I think, represent that they will
not recklessly fail to read a statute before answering a single simple legal
question. What is the sense of the constitutional requirement that defen-
dant have counsel before pleading guilty, if the counsel be utterly without
legal competence to guide his client?
Id. (Frank, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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and in any event, it is inconsistent with the contemporary standard.23 2
Under the rule in Brady v. United States, the Parrino court's statement
would seem to be incorrect, because it holds a plea voluntary even
though the defendant was denied the benefit of "'the actual value of
any commitments made to him by ... his own counsel.' 233
In another leading pre-Strickland decision, Tafoya v. State,234 the
Alaska Supreme Court refused to allow withdrawal of a guilty plea in
the face of a claim that defense counsel failed to inform the defen-
dant that he was subject to deportation. 235 Tafoya is widely cited even
though it was decided under the "farce and mockery" standard of
competence rejected by the Supreme Court in Strickland.236
B. Brady Voluntariness Cases as the Standard for Effective
Assistance
The collateral consequences rule is based in large part on the
Brady Court's implication that a trial court need advise a defendant
only of direct consequences to render a plea voluntary under the Due
Process Clause. If a plea is voluntary under Brady because the plea
court has explained the direct consequences, courts reason that de-
fense counsel's failure to do more cannot render the plea involuntary.
For example, Judge Edith Jones wrote for the Fifth Circuit that the
collateral consequences rule "squares with the Supreme Court's obser-
vation that the accused must be 'fully aware of the direct conse-
quences' of a guilty plea."23 7 The Seventh Circuit was equally explicit
in arguing that the identical voluntariness analysis applied to both
court and counsel:
Since the doctrine provides a test for determining the voluntary and
intelligent character of the plea, it is applied both to the trial
court-as a measure of its performance in establishing the volun-
tary and intelligent character of the plea before accepting it-and
to defense counsel-as a measure of his performance in providing a
defendant with the information necessary to render the plea volun-
tary and intelligent.23 8
232 Judge Frank interpreted the majority's reference to "'unprofessional conduct'" as
meaning "conduct justifying disbarment." 1d. at 925 (Frank, J., dissenting).
233 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (quoting Shelton v. United States,
246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc)).
234 500 P.2d 247 (Alaska 1972).
235 Id. at 251-52.
236 Id. For examples of post-Strickland cases that cite to Tafoya, see People v.
Davidovich, 618 N.W.2d 579, 582 n.8 (Mich. 2000); and Commonwealth v. Frometa, 555
A.2d 92, 94 n.2 (Pa. 1989).
237 Banda v. United States, 1 F.3d 354, 356 (5th Cir. 1993) (emphasis in original)
(quoting Brady, 397 U.S. at 755).
238 Santos v. Kolb, 880 F.2d 941, 944 (7th Cir. 1989).
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In United States v. Campbell, the Eleventh Circuit noted that "actual
knowledge of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea is not a pre-
requisite to the entry of a knowing and intelligent plea. Therefore, a
defendant's lack of knowledge of those collateral consequences can-
not affect the voluntariness of the plea."239 Other courts have also
found effective assistance of counsel because Brady voluntariness was
achieved.240
But just as defense counsel and the court have different duties of
loyalty, investigation, and legal research as a result of their distinct
roles as advocate and decisionmaker, there is no reason to assume
that their obligations of advising the accused of the risks and benefits
of pleading guilty should be identical. The judge is charged with en-
suring that the plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent; counsel's
job is to assist with the determination that a plea is a good idea, which
encompasses a broader range of considerations. The Court's deci-
sions contemplate independent responsibilities of counsel and court,
each of which must be satisfied to render a plea voluntary: A plea is
invalid if the trial court falls to conduct a plea colloquy establishing
that the plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, or if the plea was
involuntary because it was induced by ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Court's Brady decision and its progeny make clear that sim-
ply because the plea court did its job does not mean that defense
counsel did, and vice versa.241 A guilty plea is valid under the Due
Process Clause only if it is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.242 To
assist the trial court's evaluation of the voluntariness of an attempted
guilty plea, and in order to facilitate any review, the Court held in
Boykin v. Alabama that facts establishing voluntariness had to appear
on the record.243 In Brady, the Court accepted the collateral-direct
239 United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 768 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing Edwards v.
State, 393 So. 2d 597, 601 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (HubbartJ., dissenting)).
240 Thus, the Nevada Supreme Court has held that knowledge of "a collateral conse-
quence... does not affect the voluntariness of the plea," and therefore "trial counsel's
failure to provide such information does not fall below an objective standard of reasonable-
ness." Barajas v. State, 991 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Nev. 1999); see also, e.g., People v. Huante,
571 N.E.2d 736, 740 (Ill. 1991) (inquiring whether counsel's performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness).
241 See, e.g., In re Resendiz, 19 P.3d 1171, 1181 (Cal. 2001) (noting that "Brady... was
not an ineffective assistance [of counsel] case").
242 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238, 243-44 & n.5 (1969).
243 See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243-44.
What is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment demands the
utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with
the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea con-
notes and of its consequence. When the judge discharges that function, he
leaves a record adequate for any review that may be later sought, and fore-
stalls the spin-off of collateral proceedings that seek to probe murky
memories.
2002]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
distinction in the context of what consequences the trial judge was
required to explain to ensure voluntariness. 244 The Court concluded
that a guilty plea entered to avoid exposure to a capital sentence was
not involuntary even though eight years later, in an unrelated case,
the Court held that the death penalty could not have been imposed
for that offense. 245 The Court cited Shelton v. United States246 for the
"standard as to the voluntariness of guilty pleas":247
"[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct conse-
quences, including the actual value of any commitments made to
him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless
induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harass-
ment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable
promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature im-
proper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's busi-
ness (e.g., bribes)." 248
Courts have construed this language to mean, by negative implication,
that some consequences need not be made known to a defendant;
these are termed "collateral."249
However, it is clear that this portion of Brady was concerned with
the plea court's obligations, not the complete catalog of the ingredi-
ents of a valid plea. Brady did not say that simply because the trial
court had done its duty the plea was ipsofacto valid, regardless of inde-
pendent constitutional violations that may have rendered the plea in-
valid, such as, for example, the complete denial of counsel. To the
contrary, Brady assumed that there was effective assistance of counsel,
explaining that "an intelligent assessment of the relative advantages of
pleading guilty is frequently impossible without the assistance of an
attorney."250 The Court observed that defendant Brady had been
"represented by competent counsel throughout."25 1
Professor Albert Alschuler has written that the cases can be un-
derstood as shifting the "central issue in guilty-plea litigation from vol-
Id. (citation and footnotes omitted); see also McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465
(1969) (noting the need "to produce a complete record at the time the plea is entered of
the factors relevant to [a] voluntariness determination").
244 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970).
245 See id. at 756-57.
246 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd, 356 U.S. 26 (1958). The Supreme Court va-
cated the defendant's conviction on "confession of error by the Solicitor General that the
plea of guilty may have been improperly obtained." Shelton v. United States, 356 U.S. 26
(1958).
247 Brady, 397 U.S. at 755.
248 Id. (quoting Shelton, 246 F.2d at 572 n.2) (internal citation omitted).
249 See United States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per curiam) ("We
presume that the Supreme Court meant what it said when it used the word 'direct'; by
doing so, it excluded collateral consequences.").
250 Brady, 397 U.S. at 748 n.6.
251 Id at 743.
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untariness to the effective assistance of counsel."252 Assuming the
presence of competent counsel, the Brady Court noted:
A plea of guilty triggered by the expectations of a competently
counseled defendant that the State will have a strong case against
him is not subject to later attack because the defendant's lawyer cor-
rectly advised him with respect to the then existing law as to possible
penalties but later pronouncements of the courts, as in this case,
hold that the maximum penalty for the crime in question was less
than was reasonably assumed at the time the plea was entered. 253
The Court's other decisions regarding guilty pleas also make
clear that counsel's duty of adequate representation is independent of
the trial court's duty to make sure that the plea is voluntary. The
Court in McMann v. Richardson2 54 rejected the argument that the
guilty pleas were invalid, notwithstanding strong arguments that the
underlying confessions should have been suppressed, and assumed
the existence of competent counsel,255 noting that in the plea
context:
In the face of unavoidable unccrtainty, the defendant and his coun-
sel must make their best judgment as to the weight of the State's
case.... Waiving trial entails the inherent risk that the good-faith
evaluations of a reasonably competent attorney will turn out to be
mistaken either as to the facts or as to what a court's judgment
might be on given facts.
... That this Court might hold a defendant's confession inad-
missible in evidence, possibly by a divided vote, hardly justifies a
conclusion that the defendant's attorney was incompetent or inef-
fective when he thought the admissibility of the confession suffi-
ciently probable to advise a plea of guilty.2 56
Similarly, in Tollett v. Henderson,257 the Court suggested that sim-
ply because the indictment to which the defendant pled was issued by
an unconstitutionally constituted grand jury did not invalidate the
conviction; instead, the question was "whether the guilty plea had
been made intelligently and voluntarily with the advice of competent
252 Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALELJ. 1179,
1180 (1975).
253 Brady, 397 U.S. at 757; see also id. at 758 (stating the Court's expectation that "courts
will satisfy themselves that pleas of guilty are voluntarily and intelligently made by compe-
tent defendants with adequate advice of counsel").
254 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
255 See id. at 768-75.
256 Id. at 769-70; see also id, at 769 (determining that whether a guilty plea "was an
intelligent act depends on whether [the defendant] was so incompetently advised by coun-
sel.., that the Constitution will afford him another chance to plead"); Parker v. North
Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 797-98 (1970) (rejecting a challenge to a guilty plea because the
Court "th[ought] the advice [the defendant] received was well within the range of compe-
tence required of attorneys representing defendants in criminal cases").
257 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
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counsel."258 The Eighth Circuit in Hill v. Lockhart maintained this dis-
tinction, noting that the state need not inform a defendant of parole
consequences of a guilty plea, but leaving open the possibility that
under Tollett and McMann, counsel's advice about parole might be in-
adequate. 259 More recent expressions of the idea that "'a voluntary
and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person, who has
been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally at-
tacked"' 260 make clear that a plea colloquy by the trial court establish-
ing voluntariness and effective assistance of counsel are independent
requirements for a valid plea.26 1
C. Decisions Citing Cases Regarding the Court's Duty of
Advisement
In theory, that the duties of the court and counsel are analytically
distinct does not foreclose the possibility that their separate roles
could impose the same substantive obligations. Many opinions adopt-
ing the collateral-direct distinction with respect to the duties of coun-
sel cite cases that explore the duties of courts taking guilty pleas
without explaining why these latter duties are applicable. 262 There is
good reason to doubt that the duties and conduct of courts and de-
fense lawyers should be regarded as identical in this context.
258 Id. at 265. The Court explained:
If a prisoner pleads guilty on the advice of counsel, he must demonstrate
that the advice was not "within the range of competence demanded of at-
torneys in criminal cases." Counsel's failure to evaluate properly facts giv-
ing rise to a constitutional claim, or his failure to properly inform himself
of facts that would have shown the existence of a constitutional claim,
might in particular fact situations meet this standard of proof.
Id. at 266-67 (citation omitted).
259 See Hill v. Lockhart, 877 F.2d 698, 703 (8th Cir.), vacated, 883 F.2d 53 (8th Cir.
1989), reinstated en banc, 894 F.2d 1009 (8th Cir. 1990).
260 Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998) (quoting Mabry v.Johnson, 467
U.S. 504, 508 (1984)); see also Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927) ("Out of
just consideration for persons accused of crime, courts are careful that a plea of guilty shall
not be accepted unless made voluntarily after proper advice and with full understanding of
the consequences.").
261 See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261-62 (1971) (holding that a valid
plea requires: "that the accused pleading guilty must be counseled"; if in federal court, that
"the sentencing judge must develop, on the record, the factual basis for the plea"; and that
"[t]he plea must, of course, be voluntary").
262 See, e.g., United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citing
United States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per curiam)); United States v.
Quin, 836 F.2d 654, 655 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing Fruchtman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946 (9th
Cir. 1976)); State v. Ginebra, 511 So. 2d 960, 961 (Fla. 1987) (citing Fruchtman, 531 F.2d at
946; Sambro, 454 F.2d at 918 (per curiam)); State v. Miranda, 675 P.2d 422, 425 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1983) (citing Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir. 1973); Sambro,
454 F.2d at 918 (per curiam)).
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Lord Coke justified the denial of defense counsel at common law
on the ground that the court would represent defendants, 263 but pre-
sumably most modern trial judges would disclaim this role. Even if
they wanted to, as the Court in Powell v. Alabama explained, trial
judges are not in a position to do it: "[H]ow can a judge, whose func-
tions are purely judicial, effectively discharge the obligations of coun-
sel for the accused?"264 A trial judge "cannot investigate the facts,
advise and direct the defense, or participate in those necessary confer-
ences between counsel and accused which sometimes partake of the
inviolable character of the confessional." 265 As Professors LaFave,
Israel, and King have explained, given that the judge is an impartial
arbiter and defense counsel is an advocate, "it is not apparent, to say
the least, why a defense attorney's responsibilities in advising his client
on such matters should be deemed to be no more extensive than the
judge's." 266
Another problem arises because the court's warning comes dur-
ing the plea colloquy itself, after the decision to plead guilty has been
made. "If the objective is to give fair warning of consequences to the
defendant and if implicit in this is a desire to have the consequences
carefully considered, a last-minute warning hardly gives time for ma-
ture reflection. '267
More fundamentally, a common justification for the limited role
of the court is that detailed exploration of collateral consequences is
defense counsel's job. The Supreme Court confirmed this allocation
of duties in Libretti v. United States,268 explaining that a plea was valid
even though certain waivers with respect to criminal forfeiture were
not made on the record by the trial court accepting a guilty plea:
Libretti was represented by counsel at all stages of trial and sentenc-
ing. Apart from the small class of rights that require specific advice
from the court under [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 11 (c),
it is the responsibility of defense counsel to inform a defendant of
the advantages and disadvantages of a plea agreement and the at-
tendant statutory and constitutional rights that a guilty plea would
forgo. Libretti has made no claim of ineffectiveness of counsel
before this Court. As we noted in Broce, "[a] failure by counsel to
provide advice may form the basis of a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, but absent such a claim it cannot serve as the predicate
for setting aside a valid plea."269
263 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61 (1932).
264 1&
265 Id
266 5 LAFAVE Er AL., supra note 50, § 21.3(b), at 119.
267 NE vmAN, supra note 2, at 208.
268 516 U.S. 29 (1995).
269 Id. at 50-51 (quoting United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 574 (1989)).
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The well-known criminal procedure treatise written by Professors
LaFave, Israel, and King likewise explains that it is unnecessary for a
judge to inform a defendant about collateral consequences because
"defense counsel should be expected to discuss with his client the
range of risks attendant his plea."270 Similarly, in a leading pre-Strick-
land case, the Second Circuit explained that the judge had no obliga-
tion to explore collateral consequences because counsel would do so:
To require that [the judge] anticipate the multifarious peripheral
contingencies which may affect the defendant's civil liabilities, his
eligibility for a variety of societal benefits, his civil rights or his right
to remain in this country, all of which might give rise to later claims
that the plea was not voluntary in the absence of an informed con-
sent, has not been required in ourjurisprudence, constitutionally or
otherwise. Defense counsel is in a much better position to ascertain
the personal circumstances of his client so as to determine what in-
direct consequences the guilty plea may trigger. [Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure] 11, in our view, was not intended to relieve
counsel of his responsibilities to his client.271
Counsel, and not the court, has the obligation of advising a de-
fendant of her particular position as a consequence of her plea.27 2
Notably, none of the decisions or commentators suggest that collat-
eral consequences are not relevant to the defendant's decision to
plead guilty, they merely suggest that bringing collateral conse-
quences to the defendant's attention is counsel's job, not the court's.
They illustrate not only that cases dealing with the limited scope of
the court's duties are inapposite, but also that counsel's job includes
consideration of collateral consequences.
D. Cases Questioning the Importance of Counsel in Pleas of
Guilty
The most influential post-Strickland case, United States v. Camp-
bell,273 has been cited in dozens of opinions in support of the collat-
eral consequences rule.274 Like the D.C. Circuit in Edwards, the
270 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 50, § 21.4(d), at 173; 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE &JEROLD H.
ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 20.4, at 649 (1984).
271 Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 1974).
272 Id at 465; see also In re Resendiz, 19 P.3d 1171, 1181 (Cal. 2001) ("Defense counsel
clearly has far greater duties toward the defendant than has the court taking a plea.").
273 778 F.2d 764 (lth Cir. 1985).
274 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2000); Varela v. Kaiser,
976 F.2d 1357, 1358 (10th Cir. 1992); Ogunbase v. United States, No. 90-1781, 1991 WL
11619 (6th Cir. Feb. 5, 1991); United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 59 (D.C. Cir.
1990); Santos v. Kolb, 880 F.2d 941, 944 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Yearwood, 863
F.2d 6, 7-8 (4th Cir. 1988); Clark v. United States, No. 87-1603, 1988 WL 17114 (9th Cir.
Feb. 25, 1988); People v. Ford, 657 N.E.2d 265, 269 (N.Y. 1995); Ex parte Morrow, 952
S.W.2d 530, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc).
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Eleventh Circuit in Campbell reasoned that counsel has a diminished
role in guilty pleas, and used that conclusion as a basis for upholding
the collateral consequences rule:
"[C]ounsel owes a lesser duty to a client who pleads guilty than to
one who decides to go to trial, and in the former case, counsel need
only provide his client with an understanding of the law in relation
to the facts, so that the accused may make an informed and con-
scious choice between accepting the prosecutor's offer and going to
trial.-275
The Campbell court relied primarily on a dissenting opinion from Ed-
wards v. State,276 a Florida case that, in turn, relied on cases using the
"farce and mockery" standard 277 and the related idea that retained
counsel as an agent of the defendant could not be ineffective. 278 Both
of these principles were later rejected by the Supreme Court in Strick-
land.279 However, Campbell purports to be decided under Strickland, so
its central importance is the implication that defense counsel's role in
a guilty plea is less significant than in the context of a trial.
The Hill v. Lockhart decision, however, contains no suggestion
that counsel's duty is less in the context of a plea.2 0 Earlier Supreme
Court decisions recognize that a defendant's decision to plead guilty
is based on at least some of the same kind of evaluation and investiga-
tion that is necessary to go to trial. In Williams v. Kaiser,28' for exam-
ple, the Court held that the considerations that led the Court in Powell
v. Alabama to require appointment of counsel for defendants going to
trial applied with equal force to defendants pleading guilty.2 8 2 In Von
Moltke v. Gillies,28 3 a plurality of the Court explained:
Prior to trial an accused is entitled to rely upon his counsel to make
an independent examination of the facts, circumstances, pleadings
and laws involved and then to offer his informed opinion as to what
plea should be entered. Determining whether an accused is guilty
275 Campbell 778 F.2d at 768 (quoting Wofford v. Wainwright, 748 F.2d 1505, 1508
(11th Cir. 1984)) (alteration in original).
276 Id. (citing Edwards v. State, 393 So. 2d 597, 601 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (Hubbart,
J., dissenting), disapproved by State v. Ginebra, 511 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 1987)).
277 Edwards, 393 So. 2d at 601 (HubbartJ., dissenting) (citing United States v. Parrino,
212 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1954)). Although Parino is not explicit on this point, the Second
Circuit at the time applied the "farce and mockery" test for ineffective assistance of coun-
sel. See United States v. Pisciotta, 199 F.2d 603, 607 (2d Cir. 1952) (Swan, J., joined by
Learned Hand & Frank, Ji.) (citing United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir.
1949)).
278 See Edwards, 393 So. 2d at 602 (Hubbart, J., dissenting).
279 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984).
280 Hill v. Lockhart, 877 F.2d 698 (8th Cir.), vaated, 883 F.2d 53 (8th Cir. 1989), rein-
stated en ban, 894 F.2d 1009 (8th Cir. 1990).
281 323 U.S. 471 (1945).
282 Id. at 475-76.
283 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
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or innocent of the charges in a complex legal indictment is seldom
a simple and easy task for a layman, even though acutely
intelligent.28 4
Professor Newman's book on guilty pleas, part of the mid-1960s
American Bar Foundation study, makes a similar point:28 5
A charge reduction or sentence promise is not ordinarily a result of
personal influence of the lawyer with the prosecutor orjudge. The
strength of a lawyer's argument for a charge reduction depends in
good part on how strong a professional case he can make for the
appropriateness of the lesser charge and doubtful convictability on
the higher count. This requires no less skillful legal ability to evalu-
ate alternatives than is required for other decisions where evidence
and convictability are involved.... In short, the full-blown negoti-
ated plea is not merely an appeal for mercy; it is an adversary pro-
cess and the lawyer serves the function of the guilty defendant's
advocate. 28 6
The idea that counsel's role in the guilty plea process is somehow a
reduced one is not supported by doctrinal or policyjustifications. To
the extent that the collateral consequences rule is informed by this
notion, it is unsound.
E. Counsel Not Appointed for Purposes of Collateral Matters
Another argument occasionally made is that the lawyer is repre-
senting the defendant in connection with the criminal prosecution,
not the collateral issues. 287 In many cases, this argument is not cor-
rect, because the collateral consequence at issue is whether a sentence
is to be served consecutively or concurrently, or whether a sentence is
to be subject to a period of parole ineligibility. In other words, some
collateral circumstances involve aspects of the prosecution that are in-
disputably subject to the right to counsel.
In any event, even though defendants may not be entitled to free
advice about employment, immigration, or other civil matters, that is
not the nature of their claim. A defendant's claim in such a case con-
284 Id at 721.
285 NEWMAN, supra note 2, at 201.
The traditional and important pretrial function of a defense lawyer is
to assess the convictability of his client and to advise him as to the type of
plea he should enter at arraignment. Except for the conclusion as to plea,
this service is supposedly much the same whether the case goes to trial or
terminates by a guilty plea. On the surface the pretrial problems which
counsel confront in guilty plea cases are very little different from those in
cases which go to trial.
Id.
286 1d at 216.
287 See, e.g., United States v. George, 869 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1989) ("While the
Sixth Amendment assures an accused of effective assistance of counsel in 'criminal prosecu-
tions,' this assurance does not extend to collateral aspects of the prosecution.").
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cerns the competent nature of her representation in a criminal case,
and trustworthy advice about whether to plead guilty. The Constitu-
tion assigns the decision whether to plead to defendants, which neces-
sarily means that they are entitled to make their decision based on
considerations that they deem important.288 A defendant is not ask-
ing too much in expecting that her legal counsel will give her reasona-
ble advice about the legal consequences of her decisions.
F. The Misadvice Line of Cases
A final category of evidence suggesting that the collateral conse-
quence rule is invalid is the exception for claims based on misadvice
rather than nonadvice. Many jurisdictions following the collateral con-
sequences rule hold that affirmative misadvice may be the foundation
of an ineffectiveness claim. 289
These cases are problematic because the Supreme Court has
ruled that ineffective assistance of counsel claims cannot be brought
with respect to proceedings that are not covered by the right to coun-
sel. 290 Thus, when an attorney makes a mistake in connection with a
discretionary appeal or a post-appeal collateral attack, such as a state
or federal habeas corpus petition, the Court has held that the ineffec-
tive assistance analysis is inapplicable because there is no right to ap-
pointed counsel for those proceedings under the Sixth Amendment
or other constitutional provisions.29' If collateral consequences are
outside the scope of the lawyer's duties under the Sixth Amendment,
it would seem to be irrelevant whether counsel failed to advise the
defendant or advised her incorrectly.2 92 If an issue is not covered by
the Sixth Amendment, it should not matter why an attorney's error
occurred or how bad the error was. By treating misadvice as a poten-
tial Sixth Amendment violation, courts imply that giving advice about
collateral consequences is part of the lawyer's constitutional duty.
There also seems to be no reason to distinguish between a situation in
288 While lawyers are not haberdashers, for example, if clothing is relevant to some-
thing that the lawyer is responsible for, such as a jury trial at which jurors might see the
defendant injail clothes, it becomes the lawyer's responsibility to offer advice. Cf Estelle v.
Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976) (holding that "although the State cannot, consistently
with the Fourteenth Amendment, compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while
dressed in identifiable prison clothes," the possibility that the defendant wore such attire as
a result of counsel's tactical decision in an effort to gain sympathy led the Court to require
a contemporaneous objection before the claim would be considered).
289 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
290 See Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88 (1982) (per curiam).
291 See id.
292 See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752-54 (1991); Wainwrigh 455 U.S.
at 587-88 ("Since respondent had no constitutional right to counsel, he could not be de-
prived of the effective assistance of counsel by his retained counsel's failure to file the
application [for discretionary appellate review] timely.").
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which an attorney affirmatively misstates the law, and one in which he
fails to make a statement when a reasonable attorney would have done
SO.
The misadvice/nonadvice distinction may be justified by some
courts by a practical consideration: It may be easier to prove that mis-
advice, rather than nonadvice, caused a particular result because the
fact that a lawyer addressed a particular issue with his client helps
demonstrate that the issue was important to the defendant at the time
of the plea as opposed to being conveniently advanced if a defendant
develops "buyer's remorse" about a plea. But even if true, in effective
assistance of counsel terms, this point goes to the prejudice prong
(whether it caused the result to be what it was) rather than to the
performance prong (whether the attorney's conduct was within pro-
fessional limits).
III
TmE "FLOODGATES" OBJECTION
Without considering collateral consequences, lawyers cannot ef-
fectively advise their clients about the risks and benefits of pleading
guilty, and cannot effectively negotiate the terms of guilty pleas.
There are no persuasive doctrinal justifications for excluding this criti-
cal aspect of competent representation from Strickland scrutiny. Yet,
in the context of a system that recognizes the right to effective assis-
tance of counsel at the plea stage, the courts have refused to recog-
nize, even in principle, that counsel should meet a standard of
competence with respect to a tremendously important decision.
The real problem may not be that courts believe counsel is unim-
portant, but rather that counsel is too important. Because a decision
to plead guilty or go to trial takes place in the course of each and
every conviction, applying the Strickland-Hill competence standard
would affect every criminal case. Courts are justifiably reluctant to
consider implementing a change that could render uncertain large
numbers of convictions. As the Supreme Court explained in United
States v. Timmreck,293 "' [t] he impact is greatest when new grounds for
setting aside guilty pleas are approved because the vast majority of
criminal convictions result from such pleas.' 294 The Illinois Supreme
Court's explanation for its refusal to require trial courts to explore
collateral consequences reflects its concern that a contrary rule would
impose duties that are not only broad, but possibly unsatisfiable:
293 441 U.S. 780 (1979).
294 Id. at 784 (quoting United States v. Smith, 440 F.2d 521, 528-29 (7th Cir. 1971)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
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Future or contemplated, but uncertain, consequences are irrelevant
to the validity of the guilty plea. "Manifestly, a criminal court is in
no position to advise on all the ramifications of a guilty plea per-
sonal to a defendant." Because the consequences of committing an
offense "are so numerous and logically unforeseeable, to require
more would be an absurdity and would impose upon the trial court
an impossible, unwarranted and unnecessary burden." . . . . 'We
will not require our trial courts to consult astrologers or invoke
psychic powers to comply with [ ... disclosure responsibilities in
accepting guilty pleas]."295
Although this rationale is persuasive in the context of the duties of
trial courts, it is much less so with respect to the duties of defense
lawyers. This is true because the primary job of lawyers is to look out
for the interests of their clients, and because there is little likelihood
that recognizing lawyers' duties would result in "a mass exodus from
the federal penitentiaries."296
The prejudice prong of ineffective assistance analysis would sim-
plify resolution of many claims. Many collateral consequences are so
unimportant that it will be clear they do not cause prejudice. 297 More
fundamentally, the greater the direct consequences, the less likely it is
that collateral consequences would make a difference. It is difficult
for an individual who has pled guilty to a serious felony to claim that
she would not have accepted a long prison sentence except on the
assumption that the collateral consequences would have been differ-
ent.298 It will be a rare case when someone who pled guilty to homi-
cide, rape, robbery, or kidnapping will have a plausible claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel on this ground.
The competence prong of the Strickland test will also smoke out
meritless claims. Most guilty pleas would be unaffected because law-
yers often do discuss collateral consequences with their clients or
there are no significant collateral consequences. 299 In addition, well-
295 People v. Williams, 721 N.E.2d 539, 544 (Ill. 1999) (alteration in original) (cita-
tions omitted); see also In re Resendiz, 19 P.3d 1171, 1191 (Cal. 2001) (Brown, J., concur-
ring and dissenting) (claiming that majority opinion may "cast a cloud on the validity of
hundreds-perhaps thousands-of guilty pleas").
296 United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 1963); see also Budeiri, supra
note 33, at 191-94 (examining this and other arguments against requiring lawyers to warn
defendants about collateral consequences).
297 Cf United States v. Raineri, 42 F.3d 36, 42 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that an error in
explaining direct consequences could not have influenced decision to plead guilty); Peo-
ple v. Goodrum, 279 Cal. Rptr. 120, 123 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that withdrawal of a plea
made after erroneous advice will be allowed only if it was significant enough to "cause a
reasonable person not to enter the plea").
298 For example, the Delaware Supreme Court had little difficulty finding that a per-
son subject to a fifteen-year imprisonment was not prejudiced by his ignorance of a two-
year driver's license suspension. See Blackwell v. State, 736 A.2d 971, 973 (Del. 1999).
299 Moreover, there is no Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel to pursue
claims in collateral proceedings, such as ineffective assistance of counsel. See Murray v.
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established Sixth Amendment doctrines would likely limit the effect of
changing the rule. For example, counsel's duties of "investigation"
and "legal research," like a duty to understand collateral conse-
quences, are potentially boundless because there is always more inves-
tigation or research that could be done. However, the
"reasonableness" limitation on the scope of counsel's obligations has
made these duties quite manageable. There is no reason to think that
this aspect of counsel's duty to understand the law would be any
different.8 00
Indeed, a defense lawyer could consider a very limited number of
issues that will cover the vast majority of collateral consequences. The
client could be asked three questions:
Are you an alien or a United States Citizen?
Do you have any prior convictions or pending charges?
Do you have any government licenses, permits, employment, or benefits?
The lawyer would also want to know two other things: What are the
collateral consequences applicable to felonies in the jurisdiction?
And, if the case involves a drug- or sex-related offense, what are the
special collateral consequences applicable to them? The answers to
these questions would arm the lawyer with information necessary to
understand and explore virtually all of the collateral consequences
that the client will face.
This manageable amount of basic spadework would enable a law-
yer to advise and assist his client, and ensure the stability of a resulting
conviction. Under general principles of Sixth Amendment law, courts
would reject ineffectiveness claims when a reasonable lawyer would
not have known of the potential collateral consequence, because the
consequence was so obscure that reasonable lawyers would not have
discovered it, because the facts upon which the collateral conse-
quence rested were not known to counsel in spite of reasonable dili-
gence, or because the possibility of the collateral consequence
materializing was so remote, or the consequence so trivial, that it was
unnecessary to consider it. Counsel are also not deemed ineffective
for failing to predict changes in the law, or changes in the factual
situation. If a lawyer's advice was reasonable given the situation at the
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). But
see Daniel Givelber, The Right to Counsel in Collateral, Post-Conviction Proceedings, 58 MD. L.
REv. 1393 (1999) (arguing that capital defendants should be afforded appointed counsel
for pursuing state collateral relief). Thus, clients would have to decide to spend money to
pursue these claims, or lawyers would have to be persuaded to take them for free. This
would help ensure that only meritorious cases were pursued.
300 Cf Nagi v. United States, 90 F.3d 130, 135 (6th Cir. 1996) (declining to find ineffec-
tiveness where counsel's decision and conduct were reasonable).
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time, a court will not deem it ineffective even if, in retrospect, it
turned out to be regrettable. 30 1
Lawyers are also not faulted for discretionary judgment calls,
even if they do not work out. A lawyer's reasoned decision about a
tactical choice which goes awry, or a lawyer's reasonable prediction
about anything, including a collateral consequence, which does not
materialize, does not constitute ineffective assistance.30 2
Another limiting factor is information provided by the client. As
the Court said in Strickland:
The reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or
substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or ac-
tions. Counsel's actions are usually based, quite properly, on in-
formed strategic choices made by the defendant and on
information supplied by the defendant. In particular, what investi-
gation decisions are reasonable depends critically on such informa-
tion. For example, when the facts that support a certain potential
line of defense are generally known to counsel because of what the
defendant has said, the need for further investigation may be con-
siderably diminished or eliminated altogether. And when a defen-
dant has given counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain
investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel's failure
to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as
unreasonable. 30 3
Thus, lawyers are not accountable for information that was concealed
from them by their client or that they failed to discover in good faith.
Therefore, if a client does not disclose that she is an alien, a lawyer
does nothing wrong by omitting to take that into account when nego-
tiating a plea.
In sum, it would be an unusual case that would satisfy these strin-
gent requirements. The kind of case that might be compelling in the
face of these limitations deserves to succeed. The most promising
case is one in which the collateral consequence is well-known and ac-
counted for by most competent practitioners, and therefore the fail-
ure of counsel to address it is a blunder. Furthermore, to raise a
plausible claim of prejudice, the direct consequences accepted in the
guilty plea must be sufficiently low compared to the collateral conse-
301 Cf Lema v. United States, 987 F.2d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 1993) (evaluating competence
from contemporaneous lawyer's perspective).
302 See, e.g., Braun v. Ward, 190 F.3d 1181, 1189 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that the
decision to be sentenced by judge rather than jury in capital case was not ineffective be-
cause the defendant "'relied on his attorney's knowledge of the law, and... instincts,'
rather than any misleading guarantees, in entering his plea" (quoting Braun v. State, 909
P.2d 783, 795 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995))), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1114 (2000).
303 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984).
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quences so that knowledge of the collateral consequences might have
made a difference.
These characteristics may explain why even some courts that ac-
cept the collateral consequences rule have nevertheless found counsel
ineffective for failing to request a Judicial Recommendation Against
Deportation for an alien client at sentencing. 30 4 All competent law-
yers should have been aware of such recommendations as they were
part of a federal statute that applied to most state and federal sentenc-
ing hearings. Requesting such a recommendation required no risks,
concessions, or tradeoffs on other issues, and could be sought after
either a plea or trial. Therefore, absent a bargained-for agreement to
leave the country or some other unusual circumstance, counsel's fail-
ure to request ajudicial Recommendation Against Deportation would
typically be unexplainable on any ground other than error.
In criminal cases with minimal direct consequences, the possibil-
ity of innocent defendants pleading guilty also warrants a requirement
that lawyers take reasonable steps to ensure that their clients under-
stand collateral consequences. In this context, another rule about col-
lateral effects, the collateral estoppel doctrine, is instructive. Many
courts refuse to give collateral estoppel effect to relatively minor con-
victions such as traffic offenses or misdemeanors because of the lim-
ited incentive even innocent defendants have to contest them. 0 5
Thus, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court has refused to give collateral
estoppel effect to a misdemeanor assault conviction, in part because
the defendant "may ... have lacked the incentive to fully and vigor-
304 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
305 See Uphoff, supra note 193, at 81-82. Scholars have argued that innocent people
sometimes plead guilty to avoid the death penalty, seeJames S. Liebman, The Overproduction
of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 2030, 2097 & n.165 (2000), but presumably this is not the
result of a failure to understand the collateral consequences of the prosecution. For other
explorations of the coercive effect of plea negotiations on the innocent and guilty, see
Alschuler, supra note 252, at 1278-1306; Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea
Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50, 59-65 (1968) (suggesting that prosecutors offer the best
bargains in weak cases, including ones in which defendant may be innocent); John H.
Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 3, 12 (1978) (arguing that
through the plea bargaining process "[w ] e coerce the accused against whom we find prob-
able cause to confess his guilt"); and john a. powell & Eileen B. Hershenov, Hostage to the
Drug War: The National Purse, the Constitution and the Black Community, 24 U.C. DAvis L. Rxv.
557, 568 n.31 (1991) ("The high volume of arrests contributes to the criminal justice sys-
tem's systematic coercion of innocent defendants to plead guilty by threatening extremely
heavy drug offense sentences should they be convicted at trial. Without pushing for pleas
in a majority of cases, the system would grind to a halt."); Samuel H. Pillsbury, Even the
Innocent Can Be Coerced into Pleading Guilty, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 28, 1999, at M5 (suggesting that
"the state can make even the innocent plead guilty" by making "offers that defendants
cannot refuse"); see also Robert E. Scott & WilliamJ. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract 101
YALE L.J. 1909, 1949-68 (1992) (discussing plea bargaining and "the innocence problem");
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE LJ. 1979, 1981-87 (1992); and
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, A Reply: Imperfect Bargains, Imperfect Trials, and Innocent
Defendants, 101 YALE L.J. 2011 (1992).
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ously litigate because of the likelihood of only a small fine being im-
posed. °30 6 The New York Court of Appeals has refused to give
collateral estoppel effect to a harassment conviction because "[t]he
brisk, often informal, way in which these matters must be tried, as well
as the relative insignificance of the outcome, afford the party neither
opportunity nor incentive to litigate thoroughly or as thoroughly as he
might if more were at stake. '307
Finally, encouraging counsel to consider collateral consequences
would help make sentences more consistent and fair.303 There is no
reason for similarly situated defendants to receive grossly different
penalties simply because of the abilities of iheir lawyers. Of course,
because lawyers are human, some variation is inevitable. However, it
would further the principle of treating like defendants alike if all de-
fendants accused of committing crimes that carry collateral conse-
quences, not just those with able counsel, had the opportunity to
consider those consequences when making a plea decision. Similarly,
defense counsel should always inform prosecutors considering crimi-
nal charges and sentencing judges of relevant collateral conse-
quences, so that they can employ this factor in their decisionmaking.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has stated that ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claims are not the proper vehicle for maintaining the standards of
the legal profession. 30 9 However, it may be inevitable that the norms
of representation expressed in the Court's decisions inform the ac-
tions of lawyers. Indeed, at least one court has used the collateral
consequences rule in a legal malpractice case,310 suggesting not only
that a lawyer ignoring collateral consequences did not violate his cli-
ent's Sixth Amendment rights, but also that failing to apprise his cli-
ents of these consequences was consistent with the exercise of due
care by an attorney. Courts are reluctant to expand the rights of those
306 Pattershall v. Jenness, 485 A.2d 980, 984 (Me. 1984).
307 Gilberg v. Barbieri, 423 N.E.2d 807, 810 (N.Y. 1981); see also, e.g., O'Neal v. Joy
Dependent Sch. Dist., No. 1, 820 P.2d 1334, 1336 (Okla. 1991) (holding that a "prior
conviction for a minor offense may not be admitted into evidence in a subsequent civil
action arising from the same facts"). But cf. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jones, 596 A.2d 414,
426 (Conn. 1991) (finding that conviction of murder after trial warranted collateral
estoppel).
308 See Nvrta', supra note 2, at 213 ("In practice the attorney who bargains for a
charge reduction for his client commonly rests his argument on precedent, on the pattern
of charge reduction which has developed in the jurisdiction . . . not inappropriate
leniency.").
309 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) ("[T]he purpose of the effec-
tive assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal
representation .... .").
310 Rogers v. Williams, 616 A.2d 1031, 1034-35 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
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who have pleaded guilty to crimes. However, this issue also affects the
representation, and hence quality of decisionmaking, of future clients
who have not yet faced the decision to plead guilty or go to trial. Few
would object in principle to these future defendants receiving reason-
ably competent advice about considerations that they deem impor-
tant. Accordingly, the collateral consequences rule should be
abandoned to improve the quality of dispositions in this important
group of cases.
